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ABSTRACT 
 How can the Navy become a better learning organization? This thesis addresses 
this question by taking a precise look at what a learning organization is, what its essential 
parts are, and why they are important. This research is qualitative in nature and includes 
analyses of published literature, public records, congressional testimonies, committee 
hearings, and documented reform attempts. The work attempts to answer why the Navy 
has struggled to become a learning organization in the past, where it has found some 
small successes, and what the reasons are for failure. 
 In summary, smarter organizations are more adaptable to challenging scenarios 
and change, and both individual sailors and teams are more likely to innovate and find 
solutions in changing environments when a strong learning infrastructure is in place. A 
learning organization provides a supportive structure that enables and encourages 
learning and brings with it a culture of collaboration and innovation by removing some of 
the barriers that prevent individual learning processes from succeeding by themselves. 
The Navy’s ability to learn as an organization is important because a Navy that has the 
capability to learn quickly and efficiently has a long-run advantage over its rivals. 
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The rate at which organizations learn may soon become the only sustainable 




The twenty-first century has proven that the United States Navy can no longer 
assume that its status as the world’s lone superpower will not be contested.2 Our Navy must 
adapt to rapidly advancing technologies and fast-rising competitors. There is strong 
consensus among today’s leaders that the military advantage gap between the United States 
and the rest of the world is narrowing, with rivals gaining in key areas and passing the 
United States in others.3 Long-term strategic competitors and adversaries with well-defined 
long-range objectives are undermining the institutional and economic order that was 
established after World War II, and our presumptive superiority in the air, maritime and 
information domains has been challenged for the first time since the end of the Cold War.4 
The three priorities of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) are to “build a more 
lethal force, strengthen alliances and find new partners, and to reform the Department of 
Defense (DOD) for greater performance and affordability.”5 This means that the twenty-
first century U.S. Navy will demand more from its Sailors, not less.  
For the sake of our national security, we must “disrupt our legacy stove-piped 
educational approach, lift it out of the twentieth century, and become a more agile learning 
 
1 “Peter Senge Quote,” A-Z Quotes, accessed November 12, 2020, 
https://www.azquotes.com/quote/783088. 
2 David H. Berger, Michael M. Gilday, and Karl L. Schultz, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (Arlington: 
United States Naval Service, 2020), 29. 
3 Michael G. Mullen et al., “Department of the Navy Education for Seapower (E4S) Study,” April 19, 
2020, 85, https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302021/-1/-1/1/E4SFINALREPORT.PDF. 
4 Berger, Gilday, and Schultz, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 29.  
5 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 5, 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
2 
organization.”6 The organization that is able to learn the fastest and get the most from its 
people will have the long-term advantage. While superior weapons and technology have 
their own merits, human factors often make the difference between winning and losing.7 
The Navy’s capacity to leverage the talent and capabilities of its Sailors, along with its 
ability to network and quickly provide solutions will be critically important if it wishes to 
maintain the capabilities gap it currently enjoys over its rivals.  
Similar to the Cold War’s arms race, this is a learning race, and we are losing. 
Despite our historical advantage, we have recognized the need to learn, and for the first 
time in twenty years we have a very clear global picture as to why our Navy’s learning is 
important. We must make learning a priority. Our Navy must find ways to learn more than 
our rivals in ways that are relevant and applicable, no matter the implications. We must do 
this, what other choice do we have? 
B. PURPOSE 
My focus for this thesis is on individual learning and why it is important for an 
organization. I acknowledge that other forms of organizational and network learning exist 
that involve the synthesis and synchronization of massive amounts of data, but my primary 
focus is on the individual, and how individuals make teams and organizations stronger 
through the development of human and intellectual capital. 
This purpose of this thesis is to answer the primary research question, “how can the 
Navy become a better learning organization?” While I have never agreed with the notion 
that today’s military should be run more like a business, I would propose that there are 
several areas where today’s military should operate more like a learning organization. Prior 
to writing this thesis, I noticed that the term “learning organization” was used often, but 
the different circumstances in which it was used also demonstrated that many individuals 
took the term to mean different things depending on the context. This thesis aims to 
properly define what a learning organization is, and to capture some of the aspects of what 
 
6 Mullen et al., “Education for Seapower,” 82. 
7 Berger, Gilday, and Schultz, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 56. 
3 
it would take for the Navy to become a better one. This thesis will also identify and attempt 
to understand previous endeavors and reasons for resistance and failure, and recognize 
examples that have made successful transitions in smaller military units and outside 
government agencies. I believe the need to understand the successful elements of a learning 
organization are vitally important, as this transformation is considered one of the essential 
foundations as established in the most recent Education for Seapower (E4S) Study.8 
This thesis is intended to continue the discussion upon previous works that have 
researched organizational improvement and commitment to lifelong learning, but with the 
concept of transformation to a learning organization as its primary focus. Previous works 
have done an excellent job highlighting the importance of aspects such as systems thinking, 
organizational change, and technology, but there has been little practical translation that 
broadly explains what a learning organization is, and how it can be applied to more modern 
military organizations. A large amount of research has also stressed the transformation and 
improvement of systems, whereas my research is focused on the ability to cultivate learning 
and the development of people, as they are the most essential part of any learning 
organization. My goal is to help bridge this gap and continue translating some of the more 
modern research for practical readers while identifying areas in which these applications 
can be successful in the Navy of today as well as in the future. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will be qualitative in nature, utilizing published literature, scholarly 
writings, congressional testimonies, academic journals, previous theses, and additional 
public records. My literature review will take a precise look at what a learning organization 
is, what the essential parts are and why each of them is important. The review will also 
pinpoint the common conditions necessary to transition to a learning organization, and how 
to identify significant signs of progress during the transformation. 
 
8 Mullen et al., “Education for Seapower,” 82. 
4 
D. ANALYSIS 
The analysis section will highlight similarities between the literature and what 
could potentially be applied to the Navy. It will also analyze historical examples of when 
the Navy enjoyed periods of innovation during both the interwar periods, and when 
engaged in conflict, highlighting areas of success and reasons for failure to determine what 
lessons should be learned for applicability moving forward. It will also examine 
organizational structures and historical learning cultures, to see if these models can assist 
the Navy in becoming a better learning organization, as well as the role of Professional 
Military Education (PME) and the Navy’s commitment to masters-level education at its 
affiliated command and staff colleges.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the importance of the learning organization and how it 
applies to meeting the requirements of the NDS. The purpose of the next chapter will be to 
review literature associated with common structures of learning organizations, and to 




II. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
1. What is a Learning Organization? 
The term “learning organization” has been used for decades, yet more research 
needs to be conducted to further define what a learning organization looks like, how it is 
structured, how it develops its leaders, teams, and individuals, and finally, how it can be 
applied to public organizations which are further bound by restrictions and requirements 
not experienced by private organizations. Understanding these key concepts are crucial 
before the Navy can become a better learning organization.  
Chris Argyris and Donald Schön were among the first to conduct research on 
learning organizations in Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective 
(1978).9 Bob Garratt made a key contribution by bringing broader awareness to the term 
“learning organization” in his book The Learning Organization (1987).10 The specific 
concept and structure of a learning organization was expanded in much greater detail by 
Peter Senge, who released his first edition of The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of 
The Learning Organization three years later. Senge’s work serves as the basis for what a 
modern learning organization is, with most of his terminology used widely to this day.11  
Senge defines a learning organization as “a place where people continually expand 
their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of 
thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are 
continually learning how to learn together.”12 Very few organizations have the advantage 
of “learning from the top,” as most will not have the advantage of a leader named Ford, 
Bell, or Jobs. These are examples of energetic leaders that at times seem to singlehandedly 
 
9 Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978). 
10 Bob Garratt, The Learning Organization (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1987). 
11 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization, Revised 
and Updated Edition (New York: Currency Publishing, 2010). 
12 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, loc 165 of 7323, Kindle. 
6 
drive innovation, but they are also rare, which is why Senge stressed “that that the 
organizations that will truly excel in the future will be the organizations that discover how 
to tap peoples’ commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organization.”13 His 
belief is that all individuals, deep down, are learners. From birth, we all learn to walk and 
speak without any formal instruction. Children are masters of trial and error, asking 
hundreds of questions, constantly inquisitive, until told to stop. Not being afraid to ask 
question is a skill that every person once possessed, and building a learning organization 
means bringing this skill back, by breaking down some of the barriers that prevent people’s 
natural curiosity to explore, learn, and grow. 
Senge also sees the learning organization as an opportunity for team members to 
feel connected and more fulfilled. It is a genuine space of liberation where individuals stop 
seeing only the complexities of systems, and instead see specific opportunities for them to 
contribute to the organization. It alleviates a traditional workplace sense of helplessness, 
and instead develops individual and team empowerment. The learning organization does 
not merely improve individuals’ ability to learn, it teaches them to restructure how they 
think. 
2. The First Four Disciplines 
To maximize a person’s ability to learn while simultaneously applying it to an entire 
organization, Senge describes the five disciplines he has found that make the most effective 
learning organizations. The first four core disciplines are Personal Mastery, Mental 
Models, Building Shared Vision, and Team Learning.14 The fifth discipline is Systems 
Thinking, which is the mechanism that ties the first four disciplines together. When these 
five disciplines are linked and operating in unison, the basic structure of a learning 
organization is in place. 
 
13 Senge, loc 175. 
14 Senge, loc 217–287. 
7 
 
Figure 1. Senge’s Core Learning Capabilities of Teams.15 
Personal mastery is “the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our 
personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality 
objectively, making it one of the essential cornerstones and the learning organizations 
spiritual foundation.”16 Senge contends that an organization is no stronger than the sum of 
its parts, which is why an organization must invest in the education and growth of its 
individuals, which in turn expands the overall organization’s capacity to learn and thrive. 
He also points out that many individuals enter the workforce full of energy and have a 
strong desire to make a difference, but that this desire tends to subside as they age or if the 
organization does not invest in them. They lose the excitement that they first brought to the 
organization and are content to simply perform their standard work functions each day, and 
go home, while the greater purpose and “sense of mission” has been lost. 
It is also important to understand that personal mastery forces both the individual 
and the organization to focus on what is critically important, which helps to ensure specific 
jobs are mission focused and position descriptions match the work being performed. It is 
also essential to view personal mastery as not having an end state. It is a process of 
continual learning, a special sense of purpose where the journey is the reward, where a 
person never “arrives.”17 An ongoing issue that many organizations face is that people and 
 
15 Source: Senge, The Fifth Discipline, loc 73. 
16 Senge, loc 239. 
17 Senge, loc 2162. 
8 
especially leaders lack personal awareness of their inner state, not understanding how they 
are connected to the entire system. Nataša Rupčić made the observation, “it is clear that 
harmonious yet unpredictable development of social systems requires meaningful 
participation of its members that are committed to their own contribution, but are at the 
same time aware of their influence on the whole.”18 
One final point is that personal mastery should not just be ascribed to a specific job 
or trade. It can also be taken to mean a mastery of vision, in which the individual embraces 
creative tension and is not afraid of failure because both the individual and the organization 
see the value of long-term success over the need to focus on short-term results.  
Figure 2. Forces of Structural Conflict.19 
Creating this space and seeing challenges as an opportunity to grow and learn is 
why personal mastery is considered the soul of the learning organization. Decades after the 
release of The Fifth Discipline, Senge said in an interview that most people he speaks with 
often “point to personal mastery as a kind of cornerstone is awakening to the central role 
of deep personal change in any real systems change.”20 
18 Nataša Rupčić, “Learning Organization – Organization Emerging From Presence,” The Learning 
Organization 27, no. 1 (January 2019): 23, https://doi.org/10.1108/TLO-09-2019-0130. 
19 Senge, loc 2399. 
20 Simon Reese, “Taking the Learning Organization Mainstream and Beyond the Organizational Level: 
An Interview with Peter Senge,” The Learning Organization 27, no. 1 (January 2020): 13, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/TLO-09-2019-0136. 
9 
Mental models are “deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures 
or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action.”21 They 
can be either well understood business norms or they can be somewhat subconscious, but 
either type can heavily sway the perceptions of the individuals in an organization. Mental 
models can hinder an organization if they include assumptions that prevent an organization 
from reaching its full potential. Some familiar adages such as “that isn’t what this company 
does” or “we cannot get into that market” are some common examples that often hold an 
organization back when it may have a chance to progress forward. 
If an organization values the importance of challenging assumptions, including 
those that are the most deeply entrenched, it puts itself in better position to reflect on past 
practices and ensure they still deliver the best solutions moving forward. Instead of mental 
models existing only as negative influencers to obstruct improvement, they are also 
excellent opportunities to learn and grow. Positive mental models sound similar to 
statements such as “at our company, we care about our customers” or “product quality is 
what’s most important to us.” Both positive and negative mental models must be 
challenged, and individuals must be open to internal exploration, asking themselves, “How 
open am I to exploring that my own way of thinking could be part of the problem?”22 
Building shared vision “involves the skills of unearthing shared pictures of the 
future that foster genuine commitment and enrollment rather than just compliance.”23 
Senge points out that some of the organizations that have found the most success are 
because they found ways to bring people together around a common purpose, what he calls 
a “sense of destiny,” similar to how Bell envisioned use of the telephone, or Apple the 
home computer. When a shared vision is genuine and has the backing of subordinates, the 
entire organization works harder toward a common goal, not because they are told to, but 
because they want to.24 
 
21 Senge, loc 252. 
22 Reese, “Taking the Learning Organization Mainstream and beyond the Organizational Level,” 13. 
23 Senge, loc 271. 
24 Ibid. 
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It is also important to understand the difference between a “genuine” shared vision, 
and a “generic” vision statement. Thomas Edison once said that a “vision without execution 
is just hallucination.”25 Some organizations may have inspirational vision statements that 
come from the top but lack the resources or ability to generate employee buy-in to achieve 
their strategic vision. Senge explains that a shared vision is not simply a common thought 
in people’s minds, it can be a driving force in people’s hearts. Henry Ford envisioned 
automobile transportation for everyone, not just the wealthy. Steve Jobs and Steve 
Wozniak envisioned the home computer as a way of “empowering” people.26 This is why 
building a shared vision that garners support on all levels of an organization is so important. 
In every instance where one finds a long-term view actually operating in 
human affairs, there is a long-term vision at work. The cathedral builders of 
the Middle Ages labored a lifetime with the fruits of their labors still a 
hundred years in the future. The Japanese believe building a great 
organization is like growing a tree; it takes twenty-five to fifty years. Parents 
of young children try to lay a foundation of values and attitude that will 
serve an adult twenty years hence. In all of these cases, people hold a vision 
that can be realized only over the long term.27 
Building shared vision also means understanding the significance of the earlier 
discipline, personal mastery. A large part of personal mastery lies within the individual’s 
ability to embrace creative tension outside of their comfort zone to improve themselves. 
These are the same individuals that when brought together, collaborate effectively by 
pushing their peers well outside their own comfort zones, so that they can collectively 
develop a shared vision that withstands scrutiny and remains relevant over time. Despite 
the excitement and inspiration that can accompany building a shared vision, the process of 
building itself is not always a pleasurable experience. Managers can have strong opinions 
of what is required, often dismissing the opinions of their subordinates because it is easier 
to speak than to listen, especially on matters that they understand, or think they understand. 
 
25 Bryan Stolle, “Vision Without Execution Is Just Hallucination,” Forbes, July 22, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bryanstolle/2014/07/22/vision-without-execution-is-just-
hallucination/?sh=37ac724a7446. 
26 Senge, loc 3227. 
27 Senge, loc 7323. 
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Figure 3. Limits to Growth.28 
This form of collaboration can take serious work, is often contentious, and relies 
on a group’s ability to survive outside of their comfort zones and their willingness to 
embrace the creative tension that the strongest shared visions emanate from. The strongest 
shared visions are the ones in which an organization is committed to “the long and often 
arduous process of dealing with the gap between that vision and what exists today.”29 
Team learning “is the process of aligning and developing the capacity of a team to 
create results.”30 Team learning begins with dialogue, which Senge emphasizes is very 
different from discussion. Some may take these terms to mean the same, but they do not. 
The key difference is that dialogue is taken to mean thinking together, whereas discussion 
is taken to mean speaking together.  
To the Greeks, dialogos meant a free-flowing of meaning through a group, 
allowing the group to discover insights not attainable individually. Today, 
the principles and practices of dialogue are being rediscovered and put into 
a contemporary context. (Dialogue differs from the more common 
discussion, which has its roots with percussion and concussion, literally a 
heaving of ideas back and forth in a winner-takes-all competition.) The 
discipline of dialogue also involves learning how to recognize the patterns 
of interaction in teams that undermine learning. The patterns of 
defensiveness are often deeply ingrained in how a team operates. If 
 
28 Senge, loc 3579. 
29 Reese, “Taking the Learning Organization Mainstream and beyond the Organizational Level,” 13. 
30 Senge, loc 3666. 
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unrecognized, they undermine learning. If recognized and surfaced 
creatively, they can accelerate learning.31 
The most critical element of team learning is alignment, because without it, 
individuals may work extremely hard, but their individual results seldom translate into 
team results because the team does not understand how best to complement each other’s 
capabilities. This leads to wasted energy and inefficiency. 
    
Figure 4. Unaligned versus Aligned Workforce. 32 
It is essential for a team to have the ability to think through complex issues, and 
ensure the team learns how to collaborate effectively so the group is more intelligent than 
any one individual. One of Senge’s most famous questions, “how can a team of committed 
managers with individual IQs above 120 have a collective IQ of 63?”33 A learning 
organization’s goal is to align the combined intelligence of individuals so that it increases 
both the individual’s and team’s capacity to learn and improve through coordination. This 
coordination is amplified when individuals learn to suspend their preconceived 
assumptions and regard each other as colleagues, which further exemplifies the difference 
between dialogue and discussion, where the team cares more about solving a problem than 
a singular individual’s need to be right. 
To enhance an organization’s ability for team learning, leaders need to create space, 
what most organizational learning experts call practice fields, where teams can come 
together and learn how to learn together. Practice fields can be question and answer 
 
31 Senge, loc 287. 
32 C Kiefer and P Stroh, “A New Paradigm for Developing Organizations,” Training & Development 
Journal, Transforming Work, 37, no. 4 (1983): 26–34, https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1983-24536-001. 
33 Senge, loc 3651 and 3660. 
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sessions, learning laboratories, interactive case studies or simulations, but they all have the 
primary goal of developing joint skill that exceeds individual skills. Creating this space is 
essential for manager’s that want their subordinates to feel secure in coming together. 
Teams that effectively learn are comfortable dealing with internal conflict and therefore 
avoid team phenomena like groupthink, and they avoid the defensive routines and 
entrenched habits of protecting themselves from embarrassment that come with exposing 
their thinking.34 By allowing teams to try new ideas and potentially make mistakes, it 
allows them to collaborate and support the organizations longer-range goals of bringing 
bigger solutions that support the organization’s shared vision. 
Team learning has received increased attention in recent years as many businesses 
have come to understand that effective teams can generate significant value for an 
organization.35 Team learning has also seen significant growth in the research community, 
becoming its’ own research domain, as team design provides a way of structuring 
organizational activities to ensure that teams operate at peak effectiveness.36 In 2019, 
Rebelo, Lourenco, and Dimas encountered thirty different definitions in their research, 
noting that “despite the lack of consensus that exists around which behaviors are included 
in the team learning process, all appeared to refer to an ongoing process of collective 
reflection and action.”37 They concluded that most authors prefer Edmondson’s 1999 
definition stating that team learning is “characterized by asking questions, seeking 
 
34 Irving Lester Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 250. 
35 Teresa Rebelo, Paulo Renato Lourenço, and Isabel Dórdio Dimas, “The Journey of Team Learning 
Since ‘The Fifth Discipline,’” The Learning Organization 27, no. 1 (January 2019): 44, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/TLO-10-2019-0144. 
36 John E. Mathieu et al., “A Review and Integration of Team Composition Models: Moving Toward a 
Dynamic and Temporal Framework,” Journal of Management 40, no. 1 (January 2014): 147, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313503014. 
37 Rebelo, Lourenço, and Dimas, “The Journey of Team Learning Since ‘The Fifth Discipline." See 
also George Boak, “Team Learning and Service Improvements in Health Care,” Team Performance 
Management 20, no. 5/6 (August 2014): 244, https://doi.org/10.1108/TPM-04-2013-0010, and Chantal M. 
J. H. Savelsbergh, Beatrice I. J. M. van der Heijden, and Rob F. Poell, “The Development and Empirical 
Validation of a Multidimensional Measurement Instrument for Team Learning Behaviors,” Small Group 
Research 40, no. 5 (October 1, 2009): 581, https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496409340055. 
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feedback, experimenting, reflecting on results and discussing errors or unexpected 
outcomes of actions.”38 
3. The Fifth Discipline 
Systems thinking, the fifth and final discipline, is where everything comes together. 
Systems thinking is what connects the first four disciplines by addressing the complexity 
of an open and constantly evolving system. It is sometimes difficult to see the entire system 
if an individual or team is too close to any one part of the problem. It can also be frustrating 
for teams hard at work addressing specific issues in one area, while not fully realizing the 
implications of their work and the effect it may have on another.  
Mental models are what an individual observes or believes in the present, short-
term, which helps to build upon the shared vision and group commitment for the long-term. 
Team learning teaches groups to look at the bigger picture, whereas personal mastery 
teaches individuals to understand how their actions impact that bigger picture. They all 
converge in systems thinking. 
The fifth discipline continues to evolve. In 2004, Senge along with Claus Otto 
Scharmer et al, “were also able to better connect the two separate system traditions of 
western science: the ‘systems thinking’ anchored in understanding engineering systems, 
which had been Senge’s initial foundation, and the newer ‘systems sensing’ developed by 
Scharmer, which is more rooted in holism and theories of living systems like 
autopoiesis.”39  
It is common to say that trees come from seeds. But how could a tiny seed 
create a huge tree? Seeds do not contain the resources needed to grow a tree. 
These must come from the medium or environment within which the tree 
 
38 Amy Edmondson, “Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 1999): 353, https://doi.org/10.2307/2666999. 
39 Reese, “Taking the Learning Organization Mainstream and beyond the Organizational Level,” 15. 
See also George Boak, “Team Learning and Service Improvements in Health Care,” Team Performance 
Management 20, no. 5/6 (August 2014): 244, https://doi.org/10.1108/TPM-04-2013-0010. 
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grows [. . .]. In a sense the seed is a gateway through which the future 
possibility of the living tree emerges.40 
Rebelo et al.’s most recent 2019 review of relevant literature supports the 
conclusion that systems thinking is the “systemic perspective where mastering the tools for 
thinking systemically are central in learning teams and central in learning organizations, 
particularly relevant in teams that deal with complex and dynamic processes and realities 
(such as management, project or commercial teams).”41  
When the core skill and fifth discipline of systems thinking is practiced correctly, 
and the preceding four disciplines have also been applied properly and operating in unison, 
the learning organization may come to experience what is called metanoia, which means 
“a shift of mind”. Senge says that metanoia is at the heart of every learning organization, 
often described as an awakening, the point where adaptive learning merges with generative 
learning, which when combined enhances an organizations capacity to create. It is the “a-
ha” moment when individuals realize that they are now part of something bigger than 
themselves and when they stop seeing the world in separate pieces and instead see it as 
more connected.42 This is comparable to the experience a person feels when part of a great 
team. This powerful feeling is something that many people continue to search for, 
something they try hard to “get back” to. People miss those instances when they felt the 
most productive, the most fulfilled, the most alive. Some spend years, even decades trying 
to recapture this feeling, and many will never feel it again, but it does not stop them from 
trying. The goal for many in a learning organization is to recapture this metanoia and 
sustain it for as long as possible. 
  
 
40 Peter M. Senge, Presence: Exploring Profound Change in People, Organizations and Society 
(London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2005), 2. 
41 Rebelo, Lourenço, and Dimas, “The Journey of Team Learning Since ‘The Fifth Discipline,’” 44. 
42 Senge, The Fifth Discipline, loc 343. 
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B. THE LEARNING CULTURE 
No problem can be solved from the same consciousness that created it; we 
must learn to see the world anew.” 
—Albert Einstein43 
 
Nothing remains the same forever. Job requirements continue to change as the 
world transitions from the industrial era to the information era, and labor will have more 
to do with the human mind than it will human hands. One cannot assume that today’s 
problems can be solved with yesterday’s organizational structures and mindsets. Today’s 
organizations must be far more adaptable and creative, willing to take risks and treat each 
failure as an opportunity to learn.44 A learning organization recognizes the need to learn as 
absolute necessity, more important than immediate goals and profit. Whereas short-term 
goals tend to focus on specific processes, efficiencies and conformity, a long-term focus 
allows for the evolution of empowerment, innovation, and teamwork. 
Just as nations have distinct cultures, organizations have distinct ways of 
believing, thinking, and acting that are manifested by symbols, heroes, 
rituals, ideology, and values. The nature of learning and the manner in 
which it occurs are determined in large measure by organizational culture. 
The culture of most organizations is one of non-learning, if not actually anti-
learning. Taking risks, trying new approaches, and sharing information may 
be discouraged, whereas “not making waves” may be rewarded. Before 
such a company can become a learning organization, it must transform these 
cultural values. Values complement the pulling force of an organization’s 
vision by pushing the company to reach that vision.45 
Learning complex new skills often requires making several mistakes to improve 
and get better, and teams need opportunities to practice where errors are understood to be 
part of the path to develop a higher quality end product. “Culture is the accumulation of 
past learning and thus reflects past successes, but some cultural assumptions and behavioral 
rules can become so stable that they are difficult to unlearn even when they become 
 
43 Michael Marquardt, Building the Learning Organization: Achieving Strategic Advantage through a 
Commitment to Learning (Boston: Nicholas Brealey, 2011), 18. 
44 Marquardt, Building the Learning Organization, 13. 
45 Marquardt, 64. 
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dysfunctional…and this type of unlearning can be emotionally difficult because the old 
way of doing things, after all, may have worked for a while and become embedded.”46 
Private organizations have far more flexibility than their public counterparts when 
building a learning culture. Michael Marquardt provides an example of what many of 
today’s private organizations strive for when making the transition from their current 
structure to a learning organization. He also illustrates the organizational shift in mindset 
from training to education, the recommended steps to take when changing organizational 
paradigms, and how to identify the transition from steady-state to an organization that 
embraces and excels with continuous change. Please see Tables 7-11 in Appendix A. 
Marquardt also breaks down what he sees as the essential pieces to a learning 
organization into five separate subsystems. If any one of the five subsystems is missing or 
deficient, it severely compromises the integrity of the entire system and diminishes the 
effectiveness of the remaining four subsystems. Please see Figures 9-14 in Appendix B. 
A learning organization promotes a culture more centered on individual 
empowerment instead of control, where leaders more closely fit the roles of an instructor, 
coach, and mentor, instead of simply a supervisor. A learning organization requires a 
different type of leader, less transactional and more transformational, which is why the 
roles of instructor, coach, and mentor are so heavily valued. Please see Table 12 in 
Appendix A.  
Russell Sarder described what he believes is the ideal learning culture along with 
the requisite learning methods and skills that will be necessary for organizations to adapt 
and evolve as the world continues to shift from the industrial age to the information age to 
meet twenty-first century challenges:47 Please see Figures 15-16 in Appendix C. 
In learning organizations, we are now witnessing a paradigm shift in 
emphasis from training to learning. Training signifies a one-way transfer of 
established wisdom or skill from the expert instructor, whereas learning 
 
46 Edgar H. Schein, “How Can Organizations Learn Faster? The Challenge of Entering the Green 
Room,” Sloan Management Review 34, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 87, 
http://www.proquest.com/docview/224958701/abstract/D21FBE85A5824B5CPQ/1. 
47 Russell Sarder, Building an Innovative Learning Organization: A Framework to Build a Smarter 
Workforce, Adapt to Change, and Drive Growth (New York: Wiley Publishing, 2016), 31. 
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varies from this process in several important ways. Learning involves not 
only absorbing existing information but also creating new solutions to 
problems that are not yet fully understood. Learning may take place with or 
without a teacher because it is a personal, group, and organizational ability. 
With training, the organization supplies information to employees; with 
learning, the organization encourages employees to wonder, question, and 
find their own answers.48 
1. Setting the Stage for Team Building 
Building an effective team first means the elimination of barriers and unnecessary 
restrictions, which helps to cultivate an environment for teamwork and learning.  
Tall, rigid hierarchies with impregnable department silos are a bane to 
learning because they block the fast and unimpeded flow of knowledge that 
is essential to being competitive. Power and authority cannot extend to the 
point of greatest impact, further diminishing the organization’s interest in 
and ability to learn. A flat, streamlined structure that incorporates team 
collaboration, and few modes of control maximizes the flow of knowledge 
and learning.49 
Flatter organizational structures are more effective at producing results because 
they are seamless and enable more honest and direct communication without unnecessary 
filtering. They allow individual units to operate with greater autonomy and grant them the 
discretion to solve problems quickly without first seeking approval. An ideal learning 
organization understands the importance of removing as many divisional barriers as 
possible because these barriers keep individuals isolated from each other and tend to bolster 
feelings of bias, suspicion, and careerism.  
Instead of arranging an organization by departments, many learning organizations 
prefer to form project-based teams. These teams enjoy integration across specialties, and 
their smaller size enables them to work faster and with greater efficiency. They are also 
more suited to network and share information up, down, and across the organization. They 
are given the discretion to make decisions for themselves, and they show great initiative 
without having to be told what to do. A learning organization has little difficulty 
understanding that mission accomplishment is more important than specific processes. 
 
48 Marquardt, Building the Learning Organization, 47–48. 
49 Marquardt, 77. 
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The most difficult barriers to remove in government organizations are the 
bureaucracies and hierarchies themselves. Bureaucratic inertia is one of the hardest things 
to break, because we can often only remove the barrier if we dismantle the organization.50 
Since this is not an option, in leu of large-scale transformation, small course corrections 
and slight improvements to current processes and programs are the next best options. 
Despite the presence of these existing barriers to learning and innovation, it is 
important to create space and allow time for teams to learn as much as possible, even if 
existing organizational structures make it difficult to do so. While the Navy has made some 
progress regarding the reduction of administrative distractions, much of its hierarchical 
structure remains due to the requirements of being subject to an annually funded 
appropriation.51 Other organizations find creative ways to centralize paper while 
decentralizing people, because they understand that “fewer bureaucracies allow the 
lifeblood of knowledge to flow quickly and freely throughout their organizations.”52 To be 
a learning organization, a group must take serious steps to remove structural barriers and 
simplify policies, and work units must ensure they have support from every level of 
management, all the way to the top.  
2. Building Effective Teams 
The first part of building effective teams means choosing the right leaders. This 
should not be confused with choosing a leader first, as it is more important to ensure the 
leader that has been chosen is the best fit for the selected team. It can be challenging to find 
the right leaders in today’s military hierarchy. Rosen argues that there is little incentive to 
innovate amongst military officers, because the promotion structure of the military tends 
to reward officers that follow more traditional career paths. He also concludes that officers 
considered “mavericks” who challenge the status quo and advocate for improvement, often 
 
50 Teaching note prepared by Mie Augier, Nick Dew and Kathryn Aten, April 2015, for instructional 
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suffer professionally for their efforts, with many failing to promote to the senior officer 
ranks. For the few that do survive and promote, it can take 20 years or longer until they are 
in senior positions of influence. This means it took an entire generation for their innovation 
to reach the top, after which they have precious few years remaining before retirement. 53 
The Navy also has a proud history, with its own mental models of service and 
leadership. Yesterday’s tough-minded leaders and their historical approaches to leadership 
can be damaging in today’s organizations if applied incorrectly. The leaders that will 
succeed the most in the future will be the ones that enable others to learn, and in a learning 
organization nothing is more important than encouraging and inspiring learning.54 
Many leaders whose tactics may have been acceptable to organizations in 
the past will find that the same approaches are unacceptable in learning 
organizations of the future. Hard-nosed managers who single-handedly 
determine team direction, make key decisions, and push employees may 
prove destructive in today’s organizations. Such managers have not realized 
that the organization has evolved from a structure based on steady-state 
control to one that thrives on learning, empowerment, and continuous 
change.55 
It can be more effective to empower a team than it is to control one, and the leaders 
that will do this the easiest will have leadership styles that resemble that of a teacher, coach, 
and a mentor. Leaders in learning organizations should be expected to take the time to 
encourage the ideas of others, motivate the team to consider perspectives previously not 
considered, and put team members into positions where they can be the most effective.  
Leaders look forward to the future. They hold in their minds ideas and 
visions of what can be. They have a sense of what is uniquely possible if 
everyone works together for a common purpose. Leaders are positive about 
the future, and they passionately believe that people can make a difference. 
But visions seen only by the leaders are insufficient for generating 
organized movement. Leaders must get others to see the exciting future 
possibilities. They breathe life into visions. They communicate hopes and 
dreams so that others clearly understand and share them as their own. They 
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show others how their values and interests will be served by the long-term 
vision of the future.56 
Leaders in learning organizations must also be approachable, and vulnerability 
should not be misinterpreted as weakness. Only through two-way learning and dialogue 
will leaders and teams expose each other to viewpoints they might not have otherwise 
considered.  
When selecting team members, leaders should strive to identify individuals that are 
not afraid of change, ask hard questions, are intellectually curious and work hard to 
improve themselves. They must also be willing to bravely challenge the status quo. Leaders 
should not be dissuaded by individuals that are dissimilar from each other, as diversity of 
thought is one of the greatest gifts of a learning organization. The best teams are made up 
of people who understand their strengths and weaknesses and use the collective talents of 
a team to improve their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses. 
3. Encouraging Team Behavior 
The strongest teams are the ones that are encouraged to be actively engaged and 
share their learning with each other. This type of proposal can be met with skepticism, as 
most military organizations are accustomed to standardized processes and are very resistant 
to change. Most people tend to resist change because they fear a loss of control or are afraid 
of uncertainty. Military individuals especially have concerns about job performance and 
perceived competence when given unfamiliar assignments, and they fear a departure from 
past procedures considered successful, or at least adequate.57 This is why a learning 
organization engages people at all levels, because their involvement helps to reduce 
animosity and gives them some control over the changes being made. Only when team 
members feel actively engaged and in control, will they feel safe to collaborate, make 
suggestions and share information with each other more freely. 
 
56 James M. Kouzes and Barry Z. Posner, The Leadership Challenge: How to Make Extraordinary 
Things Happen in Organizations (Hoboken, New Jersey: Jossey-Bass, 2017), 100. 
57 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, “Ten Reasons People Resist Change,” Harvard Business Review, September 
25, 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/09/ten-reasons-people-resist-chang. 
22 
It is essential to involve team members in the development of strategy. According 
to Sarder, “collaboration, innovation, experimentation, risk-taking, and information 
sharing are hallmarks of a learning organization.”58 Oftentimes the best solutions come 
from experienced workers, not corporate headquarters. Therefore, a learning organization 
reduces dependency on specific decision makers and instead pushes as much responsibility 
as possible to the individuals most capable of making the decision. This trust and delegation 
of authority shifts power and learning to where the best information and greatest need 
exists, away from the conference room and instead to the factory floor. Learning 
organizations understand that empowered teams often make better decisions than corporate 
leaders, because they are so close to the action, they have real-time information and can 
make faster and better decisions. According to Marquardt, “learning organizations take 
brave, bold steps to encourage as many people as possible to experiment, innovate, and get 
out of the habit of asking for permission and waiting for instructions.”59 
Along with empowerment, learning organizations share responsibility. They do not 
assign tasks to individuals; they assign them to teams. Teams share responsibility for the 
collection and transfer of knowledge to others. The best teams are often made from 
individuals across different career fields. Job rotation, lateral transfers and team mixing are 
effective ways to share knowledge, because subject matter experts are put into positions 
where they can ensure the successful transmission of their knowledge. Team members that 
bring new perspectives are also more willing to ask the “dumb” questions that can lead to 
new insights.60 
Finally, encourage constant open and honest feedback. A team that cannot be 
honest with itself is doomed to fail. A team needs to collectively acknowledge what is 
working, and what is not. It is difficult to succeed when leadership goes against the best 
impulses of its employees.61 If team members are unclear or do not understand the 
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requirements or priorities of leadership, then a gap exists that must be bridged. This goes 
back to building shared vision, without which it is nearly impossible to build a creative 
environment. 
C. THE LEARNING ADVANTAGE 
An organization's ability to learn, and translate that learning into action 
rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage. 
—Jack Welch62 
 
In this rapidly changing, highly competitive environment, learning 
organizations have a crucial advantage. They can respond more quickly and 
effectively to change. They are better able to keep ahead of the competition 
by coming up with innovative products and services. They are less likely to 
become mired in inefficient practices, more able to address problems 
quickly, and better at operating efficiently. Crucially, they are far more 
likely to attract and retain the best employees.63 
1. Quantum Leaps 
Imagination is everything. It is the preview of life’s coming attractions. 
—Albert Einstein64 
 
In the 1920s, Einstein introduced the world to quantum physics, looking at the 
world at the subatomic level, where there are discrete events and undefined relationships. 
A sudden, highly significant advance or breakthrough is known as a quantum leap.65 A 
learning organization understands that it cannot predict anything with certainty, which 
forces it to change the way it thinks and attempts to solve problems. An inability to adapt 
or survive means to become extinct, like the dinosaur. A learning organization can not only 
survive a quantum leap but also succeed through them. “Continuous improvement means 
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that every quantum leap becomes an opportunity to learn and therefore prepare for the next 
quantum leap. If we learn faster than our competitors, the time span between leaps reduces 
and progress accelerates.”66 A true quantum leap is when an organization creates new 
thinking and subsequent knowledge, rapidly enhancing itself instead of mere gradual 
improvement.67 
2. Discussion versus Dialogue 




Remember that discussion and dialogue, while often used interchangeably, have 
different meanings. The word discussion is often taken to mean speaking together, whereas 
the word dialogue is usually taken to mean thinking together. 
Dr. David Bohm points out that the word “discussion” has the same root as 
percussion and concussion. It suggests something like a “ping-pong game 
where we are hitting the ball back and forth between us.” In such a game 
the subject of common interest may be analyzed and dissected from many 
points of view provided by those who take part. Clearly, this can be useful. 
Yet, the purpose of a game is normally “to win” and in this case winning 
means to have one’s views accepted by the group. You might occasionally 
accept part of another person’s view in order to strengthen your own, but 
you fundamentally want your view to prevail.” A sustained emphasis on 
winning is not compatible, however, with giving first priority to coherence 
and truth. Dr. Bohm suggests that what is needed to bring about such a 
change of priorities is “dialogue,” which is a different mode of 
communication. By contrast with discussion, as Senge also pointed out, the 
word “dialogue” comes from the Greek dialogos. Dia means through. Logos 
means the word, or more broadly, the meaning. Bohm suggests that the 
original meaning of dialogue was the “meaning passing or moving through 
… a free flow of meaning between people, in the sense of a stream that 
flows between two banks.” In dialogue, Bohm contends, a group accesses a 
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larger “pool of common meaning,” which cannot be accessed 
individually.69 
While ideas may be explored through discussion, they are best developed through 
dialogue. In a discussion people speak, in a dialogue people learn. The most effective 
learning happens in a space where individuals are open and searching for new ideas in 
casual, sometimes spontaneous ways. This allows their ideas to be tested and challenged, 
and the solutions that emerge are often the ones the mean the most to the team because they 
have survived this back-and-forth process. A dialogue allows a person to examine their 
own thinking, suspend their assumptions, and allows different perspectives to assist in 
finding solutions. Instead of arguing which recommendation is the best in a discussion, the 
product of a dialogue often turns into the recommendation.  
In his book, Dialogue and the Art of Thinking Together (1999), William Isaacs 
defines dialogue “as a conversation with a center, not sides…a way of taking the energy of 
our differences and channeling it toward something that has never been created before, 
lifting us out of polarization and into a greater common sense as a means for accessing the 
intelligence and coordinated power of groups of people.”70 A dialogue is a team activity of 
thinking and reflecting, what Isaacs describes as not something you do to someone, but 
rather something you do with someone. A dialogue shifts the attitudes and perceptions of 
others and in turn does not attempt to make others understand us, but instead allows people 
to better understand themselves and each other. 
3. Innovation versus Imitation 
Innovations are often described incorrectly. An organization may discover a best 
practice that it wishes to emulate, however this is not innovation, it is imitation. A best 
practice is also by definition a “past practice”. When competitors copy each other, it is 
imitation, when an organization learns to create something new, it is innovation. The 
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difference between copying and creating is similar to imitation versus innovation. 
Innovation is also different from invention. 
On a cold, clear morning in December 1903, at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, 
the fragile aircraft of Wilbur and Orville Wright proved that powered flight 
was possible. Thus, was the airplane invented; but it would take more than 
thirty years before commercial aviation could serve the general public. 
Engineers say that a new idea has been “invented” when it is proven to work 
in the laboratory. The idea becomes an “innovation” only when it can be 
replicated reliably on a meaningful scale at practical costs. If the idea is 
sufficiently important, such as the telephone, the digital computer, or 
commercial aircraft, it is called a “basic innovation,” and it creates a new 
industry or transforms an existing industry. In these terms, learning 
organizations have been invented, but they have not yet been innovated.71 
Invention is progress, but it normally only works in static environments, and the 
dilemma with imitation is that it has limits. Imitation can only carry an organization as far 
as current technology and existing capabilities allow, whereas innovation has the potential 
to expand current capabilities through social comparison and interunit competition. A 
learning organization has an innovation advantage because through personal mastery its 
people are the best at what they do, and through team learning the organization is able to 
find solutions faster than its competitors because it is not hindered by unbending 
hierarchies nor bound to obsolete bureaucratic procedures.72 Innovation will almost always 
be more expensive than imitation, but a learning organization does not see this as an 
expense, it is an investment that can reap quantifiable rewards for the organization 
committed to a long-term strategy.  
Learning organizations enjoy a recruitment and retention advantage because people 
want to be employed in positions that provide opportunities for growth. A 2014 survey, 
Global Human Capital Trends by Deloitte found that investments in training and 
development led to higher job performance, and the primary reason individuals leave an 
organization is because of a lack of opportunity.73 A 2012 GE Capital report also concluded 
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that the “training and development of employees is a critical business driver that not only 
leads to high-performing employees, but also to consistent workforce retention.”74 
4. Learning Speed  
In a fast-changing world where affordable technology becomes a great equalizer, 
“people” will make the difference between success and failure. An investment made into 
the learning of employees gives an organization a sustained competitive advantage over its 
rivals. In 2019, Deloitte’s Global Human Capital Trends report found that the speed of 
learning is a key competitive advantage.75 
In a world where technology is changing jobs and people are living longer 
lives with more diverse careers, organizations have not only an opportunity, 
but a responsibility, to reinvent learning so that it integrates into the flow of 
work—and life," Deloitte conclude. "In the age of the social enterprise, 
organizations will realize that creating and maintaining a culture of lifelong 
learning is not just part of their mission and purpose but is what gives their 
workers meaning both in and out of the workplace.76 
Just as a learning organization navigates quantum leaps, it constantly reevaluates 
itself, committing to redesigning jobs, reinventing work, and reskilling workers. A 
successful learning organization is the first to adapt to a changing environment, sustaining 
its competitive advantage over its rivals, and the organization that learns how to do this the 
fastest has the long-run advantage. A more traditional corporate or industrial organization 
cannot adapt as quickly, regardless how many times it shuffles staff or right-sizes itself.77  
According to Knott, the organizational IQ of an organization helps to indicate its 
learning speed. Knott went on to conclude “that firms need to be smarter—being smarter 
 
74 “Learning by Doing: GE’s Approach to Developing People,” GE Capital, 2012, accessed December 
6, 2020, https://www.gecapital.com//en/pdf/GE_Capital_Example_Learning_By_Doing.pdf. See also 
Sarder, 11. 
75 Deloitte, Leading the Social Enterprise: Reinvent with a Human Focus, 2019, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/5136_HC-Trends-2019/DI_HC-Trends-
2019.pdf. 
76 Adi Gaskell, “Speed Of Learning As The New Competitive Advantage,” Forbes, June 10, 2020, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/adigaskell/2019/06/10/speed-of-learning-as-the-new-competitive-advantage/. 
77 Marquardt, Building the Learning Organization, 79. 
28 
(having organizational higher IQ) provides greater returns to its own R&D.”78 The smarter 
organization with the ability to learn the fastest will also be the organization first to adapt, 
survive, and succeed where other organizations fail. 
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY 
No passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and 
reasoning as fear.  
—Edmund Burke 79 
 
Many managers still believe in the power of fear to motivate. This twentieth century 
industrial model may have worked on factory floors or working in fields, but it is not as 
effective to motivate in the twenty-first century. Fear only serves to entice someone to do 
their job and nothing more. Worse, fear inhibits learning, prevents the sharing of ideas, and 
impedes individuals from asking questions or raising concerns.80 If individuals in an 
organization are afraid to speak up, the organization’s ability to innovate and grow 
becomes threatened. 
Table 1. How Psychological Safety Relates to Performance Standards.81 
 
 
78 Anne Marie Knott, “R&D/Returns Causality: Absorptive Capacity or Organizational IQ,” 
Management Science 54, no. 12 (November 2008): 2054–67, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0933. 
79 “Edmund Burke Quote,” Brainy Quote, accessed December 16, 2020, 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/edmund_burke_138679. 
80 Amy C. Edmondson, The Fearless Organization: Creating Psychological Safety in the Workplace 
for Learning, Innovation, and Growth (New York: Wiley Publishing, 2018), 13. 
81 Edmondson, The Fearless Organization, 18. 
29 
With fear comes the unintended consequence of silence. Innovation does not come 
from silence, and when individuals are afraid to speak up and voice concerns, it puts the 
organization and its customers at risk. Individuals that feel psychologically safe are more 
engaged, and more comfortable sharing knowledge even when their confidence is low. 
Modern work is becoming less simple and routine, it has become an environment where 
people need to multitask and work together which is why collaboration and the ability to 
speak up is so important. 
A LEARNING ENVIRONMENT DEPENDS ON SAFETY. Safety is a 
basic human need. It is indispensable at every stage of the growth and 
development of an individual or an organization. A learning organization 
provides continual permission and incentive for everyone in the 
organization to think well and benefit from the thinking of others. People 
dedicated to the challenge of creating a learning organization seek to 
provide a working environment that does not focus solely upon money, 
power, control, status, or superiority. Instead, it develops the capacity to be 
involved with a pair, a group, a team, or an organization, and to engage in 
networks that extend beyond the local group. Such associations enable a 
person to be constructive, and to feel honored, respected and recognized.82 
Only in a psychologically safe environment can someone achieve their full potential 
and earn the confidence to experiment and fail without fear, guilt, or shame. A cohesive 
team is more open to new ideas and approaches, less protective of their personal image and 
status, and “facilitates non-defensive reactions and encourages members to be open to and 
speak up about new challenges.”83 Historically individuals have been afraid to speak up, 
as “innovative thinking can put people out of work just as mercilessly as non-thinking and 
failing to adapt to new challenges can, which is why people need to know that new ideas 
will not endanger their jobs.”84 A learning organization will reward risk-takers. 
Psychological safety does not mean removing someone from accountability, as the pressure 
to deliver results often fuels the passion that generates the best creativity that is often 
needed for the best collaboration and learning.  
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William Kahn, known in business literature as the “Father of Employee 
Engagement”, defined psychological safety as “feeling able to show and employ one’s self 
without fear of negative consequences to self-image, status, or career... and where people 
felt safe in situations in which they trusted that they would not suffer for their personal 
engagement.”85  
Psychological Safety means letting people know that a change or suggestion will 
not jeopardize their careers and that they will not be punished for honest mistakes. A 
longer-range success outlook allows for short-range mistakes. Coaching and rewarding 
innovative thinking, experimentation, and providing opportunities for training and 
“practice fields” are all examples of building psychological safety.86 If an organization 
seeks to incentivize positive behaviors and has a desire for skill learning to work, people 
will need opportunities to practice and make mistakes, and to be confident that they are 
working in a safe environment that they can feel comfortable coming forward if they 
identify a problem. 
A 2019 report by the Navy’s Vice Admiral McCollum emphasized that 
“psychological safety was discussed as a precondition for realizing a true learning culture, 
leadership was cited as its most important criterion. Without the right leaders, culture 
change and other large, transformative initiatives are likely to fail.”87 Leaders are what set 
the stage for a productive learning organization because they bring with them the soft skills 
necessary to engage this next-generation workforce. The next generation of millennial 
workers are much more engaged and in need of more continuous feedback when compared 
to their Generation X and Baby Boomer predecessors.88 They prefer to always be learning 
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and growing, and they want to know how they are doing on a consistent basis.89 Old ways 
of leading and previous human resource techniques will have to be updated if a modern 
organization wishes to retain its top performers. One of the best ways to combat this is to 
simply be as open and honest as possible, and introducing candor into daily conversations 
is a proven method of sustaining this type of creative environment. This is why 
psychological safety is such a key ingredient to a successful learning organization. 
E. THE FOUR TYPES OF LEARNING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
For the Navy, a quick transition from an annually appropriated bureaucracy to a 
more effective learning organization is unrealistic, but knowing the realities of where we 
are now, there are steps we can take in the present to become a better learning organization 
in the future.  
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Just as learning organizations are not created overnight, a learning organization 
cannot be developed quickly, but there are steps that can be taken immediately that serve 
as the small course corrections that can have profound positive effects in the future, which 
will be discussed further in succeeding chapters. 
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III. EXTENSION AND SYNTHESIS FROM LITERATURE 
 EVOLUTION OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
There is a consensus among the literature that becoming a learning organization means 
making a long-term commitment to organizational improvement and continuous learning. For 
this to happen, an organization needs an organizational structure that is supportive of its 
members, and a learning culture that is conducive to education. It is difficult to see through the 
lens of this “bigger picture,” as many organizations may feel the urge to address the smaller 
issues of a larger problem, primarily because, it is easier, and often simpler to measure results 
and turn them into a proposed solution. Once a problem has been identified, it is much easier 
to concentrate on grooming or developing a specific group of people, focus on one department, 
instead of tackling something larger, perhaps even systemic, in the larger organization. While 
these targeted approaches may solve problems in the short-term, they often fail to address the 
larger issues that hold organizations back, which prevents organizations from adapting and 
improving their policies and procedures over the long-term. 
1. Previous Definitions and Current Gaps 
A lot has been written about “how to build” a learning organization since Senge’s 
pioneering work in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the conceptualization of what makes a 
learning organization has evolved during that time. “Senge was quite high-level, he was 
kind of visionary in his day, but people struggled to implement his ideas because they 
weren’t actionable enough, and it was just a bit too complex….too many disciplines, too 
many rules, and hard to actually do it.”91 The groundbreaking disciplines he brought 
forward have been expanded and further explored by several organizational learning 
experts since his original work, many of them working with Senge himself to further 
understand how to apply the disciplines and pragmatically build a learning organization in 
a diverse variety of fields. 
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Tom Kramlinger noted how the term “learning organization” began popping up in 
the early 1990s, concluding it was a result both of the sudden popularity of Senge’s book, 
The Fifth Discipline, and due to a perceived rush for organizations to reevaluate business 
practices due to the demands of transitioning from the industrial age to the information 
age.92 Kramlinger also notes that prior to Senge and Garratt’s individual works, workforce 
training was very specific, which often resulted in the creation of courses or classes 
measured to fit specific individuals and give them specific skills through various 
curriculum. Prior to the focus on learning organizations, organizational learning in the 
1980s stressed the importance of “teams”, which evolved into Senge’s discipline of team 
learning becoming a larger unit of focus in the 1990s, with more scrutiny on workplace 
culture and organizational structures. Kramlinger also had his own working definition of a 
learning organization, describing it as “a large body of aligned individuals whose members 
at all levels spontaneously learn and innovate in ways that promote the well-being and 
mission of the organization.”93 Kramlinger stressed that learning must be a goal for 
everyone in an organization, not just top management.94 
There have been a wide variety of opinions and definitions regarding what 
specifically a learning organization is. What most definitions have in common, is that there 
is near unanimous consent that being a learning organization means having the ability to 
adapt, challenge assumptions and existing practices, and question how the organization 
thinks and learns. 
In his book, Workplace Learning (2019), Nigel Paine highlights that the most 
important pieces to have in place before a learning organization can grow are trust, 
collaboration, sharing, and a clear sense of purpose. Paine stresses that if an organization 
cannot establish a clear sense of purpose and a high-trust environment, nothing changes. 
He also illustrates how a learning culture is just as important as learning itself, as “learning 
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itself needs a strong culture in which to grow and flourish, rather like bacteria in a petri 
dish.”95 
David Garvin’s 1993 Harvard Business Review article, Building a Learning 
Organization, acknowledged that before Senge’s book, The Fifth Discipline, the term 
“learning organization” and its actual meaning was subjective and confusing, as it meant 
different things to different people and different types of organizations. This article remains 
one of today’s most heavily cited pieces of literature for modern day organizations wishing 
to transition, as Garvin offers a slightly more specific yet understandable framework for 
organizations to follow. Garvin’s work focuses on the “Three M’s”, which are Meaning, 
Management, and Measurement: 
Most discussions of learning organizations finesse more complicated issues. 
Their focus is high philosophy and grand themes, sweeping metaphors 
rather than the gritty details of practice. Three critical issues are left 
unresolved; yet each is essential for effective implementation. First is the 
question of meaning. We need a plausible, well-grounded definition of 
learning organizations; it must be actionable and easy to apply. Second is 
the question of management. We need clearer guidelines for practice, filled 
with operational advice rather than high aspirations. And third is the 
question of measurement. We need better tools for assessing an 
organization’s rate and level of learning to ensure that gains have in fact 
been made.96 
Garvin also points out the difference between organizational learning and a learning 
organization, and that many organizations that excel at organizational learning, still fall 
well short of meeting the definition of a learning organization. Many organizations assume 
that these two terms mean the same thing, which they do not. While organizational learning 
is considered to be a process, the learning organization is more considered the structure. 
This process versus structure, and understanding the differences between the two, is a 
central element of Paine’s practical translation for both in his 2019 work. Garvin’s five 
building blocks he deems necessary to earn the reputation of a learning organization are: 
1. Systematic Problem-Solving 
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2. Experimentation 
3. Learning from Past Experience 
4. Learning from Others 
5. Transfer in Knowledge97 
According to Garvin, systematic problem-solving means relying on the scientific 
method and data, never on guesswork nor assumptions. Experimentation searches for and 
tests new knowledge, embracing creativity, taking risks, and works to find new ideas, even 
if those ideas come from outside of the organization. They can also support demonstration 
projects that attempt to find and develop improved organizational capabilities, usually with 
a “clean slate” approach, starting from scratch not hindered by current practices. Learning 
from past experience means reviewing success and failure, capturing lessons learned and 
making them accessible to employees so they can easily find and learn from them. Learning 
from others means learning from other organizations in similar fields, as well as 
organizations from vastly different fields, as these organizations are great resources for 
new ideas. Garvin points out that “Roger Milliken calls this process SIS (Steal Ideas 
Shamelessly), which is a broader term for benchmarking.”98 Transfer in knowledge means 
sharing information broadly; it cannot simply reside at the top of an organization. These 
can consist of reports, videos, tours, but the best methods are the ones that provide first-
hand experience, not just a document that reports on it. Temporary or permanent job-
swapping within an organization is another great way to facilitate knowledge transfer. 
Garvin also acknowledges that measuring the success of a learning organization 
can be difficult, as managers have long said “if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” 
He stressed that the biggest challenge regarding measurement techniques is that they too 
often focus on short-term results, and do not necessarily capture the “learning” that has 
been achieved by an organization. He does simplify some of Senge’s work by emphasizing 
that in a learning organization, management must attempt to free up employees’ time, and 
reduce pressure so that they feel comfortable taking the time to learn, brainstorm, 
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breakdown boundaries, exchange ideas, and experiment.99 He concludes that a learning 
organization is not built overnight, but it will gradually push for a “subtle shift in focus, 
away from continuous improvement and toward a commitment to learning.”100 
According to Finger and Brand, a learning organization is “an ideal towards which 
organizations have to evolve in order to be able to respond to the various pressures they 
face…characterized by a recognition that individual and collective learning are key.”101 
Schön explained a learning organization as acknowledging increasing change with a need 
for continuous learning. He further explained that organizations must learn to understand 
and manage their own transformation in response to changing conditions and requirements, 
and that “we cannot expect new stable states that will endure for our own lifetimes.”102 In 
his book, Living on Thin Air. The New Economy (1999), Leadbeater explains that despite 
most economies primary goal of profit over everything else, developing intellectual capital 
and knowledge is essential, and that organizations must invest in people instead of just 
technology, as failure to do so will spell disaster.103  
Most criticisms of Senge tend to center on his work being “too idealistic,” which is 
somewhat ironic as he describes himself as an “ideal pragmatist.” “John Van Maurik has 
suggested that Senge is simply ahead of his time, as his ideas are insightful and 
revolutionary. He also said it is unfortunate that more organizations have not taken his 
advice and have remained geared to the quick fix.”104  
There have been various attempts by writers to move “beyond” the learning 
organization. (The cynics among us might conclude that there is a great deal 
of money in it for the writers who can popularize the next ‘big thing’ in 
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management and organizational development). Thus, we find guides and 
texts on the developing organization, the accelerating organization, and the 
ever-changing organization. Peter Senge, with various associates, has 
continued to produce workbooks and extensions of his analysis to several 
of these particular fields.105 
Most authors tend to agree with Senge’s original work, with many working to 
expand his disciplines instead of criticizing. More recent research has moved towards 
Edmondson and Moingeon’s work on psychological safety and building trust in 
organizations, and how it relates to the increased focus on Cohen and Prusak’s research on 
social capital.106 While human capital describes an investment in an individual’s 
experience and skills, social capital is an investment in social relationships that make an 
organization more than a loose collection of individuals and draws them into groups.107 
2. Meeting Criteria 
It is not the strongest of the species who survive, nor the most intelligent; 
rather it is those most responsive to change.108  
—Charles Darwin 
 
It is difficult to find living-examples of learning organizations, and some feel that 
the definition is too broad. Many however, can point to examples of what a learning 
organization is not, such as General Motors before its NUMMI alliance with Toyota, or 
Kodak, and its blind spot to digital video technology.109 More recently, Boeing and its 
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string of mishaps with the 737 MAX.110 Many organizations that could claim learning 
organization status in the past, have not been able to maintain their reputations over time. 
While unfortunate, it is also completely normal, as the literature reminds us that becoming 
a learning organization is not a destination, but more of a continuous journey, where 
organizations must adapt to a changing world by continuing to learn, adapt, and survive.  
In their 2008 article, Is Yours a Learning Organization?, Garvin, Edmondson and 
Gino point out three factors that commonly prevent many organization’s from reaching 
their desired learning organization status: 
First, many of the early discussions about learning organizations were 
paeans to a better world rather than concrete prescriptions. They 
overemphasized the forest and paid little attention to the trees. As a result, 
the associated recommendations proved difficult to implement—managers 
could not identify the sequence of steps necessary for moving forward. 
Second, the concept was aimed at CEOs and senior executives rather than 
at managers of smaller departments and units where critical organizational 
work is done. Those managers had no way of assessing how their teams’ 
learning was contributing to the organization as a whole. Third, standards 
and tools for assessment were lacking. Without these, companies could 
declare victory prematurely or claim progress without delving into the 
particulars or comparing themselves accurately with others.111 
According to Garvin et al, “organizational research over the past two decades has 
revealed three broad factors that are essential for organizational learning and adaptability: 
a supportive learning environment, concrete learning processes and practices, and 
leadership behavior that provides reinforcement.”112 These authors refer to these three 
factors as the “building blocks” of a learning organization, with several learning 
organization assessments and surveys have been developed with these factors in mind. 
The first building block, a “supportive learning environment, includes 
psychological safety, appreciation of differences, openness to new ideas, and time for 
 
110 Sandra J. Sucher, “How Boeing Should Have Responded to the 737 Max Safety Crisis,” Harvard 
Business Review, March 14, 2019, https://hbr.org/2019/03/how-boeing-should-have-responded-to-the-737-
max-safety-crisis. 
111 David A. Garvin, Amy C. Edmondson, and Francesca Gino, “Is Yours a Learning Organization?,” 
Harvard Business Review, March 2008, 2, https://hbr.org/2008/03/is-yours-a-learning-organization. 
112 Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino, 3. 
40 
reflection.”113 All of these subcomponents help to create a learning environment that is 
tolerant of opposing ideas, and encourages asking questions and taking risks in designated 
practice fields without fear of punishment. Leadership can make or break a supportive 
learning environment, as time to question and reflect must be allotted for (and sometimes, 
“scheduled”), otherwise there is no time for analysis and constructive review of an 
organization’s activities.  
The second building block, concrete learning processes and practices, involves the 
sharing of information, experimentation, intelligence gathering to track trends, analysis to 
recognize and resolve issues, and training and education for all employees. Knowledge 
must be shared, laterally and vertically within an organization. Audits, lessons-learned 
reports, and after-action reviews should also be conducted and shared across the 
organization where possible. These types of processes answer key questions such as, “What 
did we set out to do? What actually happened? Why did it happen? What do we do next 
time?”114 These are the types of questions that help an organization decide which processes 
need to be improved (or abandoned) based on their effectiveness and relevancy as trends 
and requirements continue to change. 
The third building block, leadership that reinforces learning, illustrates the 
importance of leadership’s behavior and how it influences (or prevents) learning in an 
organization. When leaders take part in back-and-forth knowledge sharing, engage in 
constructive debate and dialogue, and not just entertain but show genuine appreciation for 
alternate points of view, individuals will be more likely to keep contributing and share even 
more new ideas in the future. 
These three building blocks are a good starting point to gauge how to become more 
like a learning organization, and have been used to create assessments similar to the 
following example: 
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Table 3. Example of Learning Organization Assessment Survey.115 
 
 
Kaiser Permanente uses a similar assessment survey that expands the original 
building blocks and applies them to health care organizations. This method utilizes a 
version of Malcom Baldrige’s framework connecting data received at the national level 
and connecting it to regions, medical centers, and unit-based teams (UBT) and unit-based 
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leader (UBL) daily activities, the results of which highlight gaps between expectations and 
actual performance.116 
Table 4. Relationships Between Learning Organization Building Blocks, 
Five Capabilities of High-Performing Health Care Organizations, and 
Characteristics of Learning Organizations Identified by Others.117 
 
 
Culture, trends, and people change with time, as do their motivations and 
personalities, therefore it is important to understand that surveys need to remain relevant. 
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While the original assessment developed by Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino is a great 
starting point, organizations should ensure they are utilizing surveys that can capture their 
modern workforce, and ensure it applies to its individuals. For example, assessments may 
need to be modified to capture the workplace culture and knowledge sharing for different 
types of organizations, such as health care facilities, corrections departments, 
manufacturing plants, and defense organizations. Each organization will have at least a few 
slight differences that could impact the survey responses given for standardized survey 
questions, which could lead to different or even confusing results if the survey is not asking 
the right questions.118 
Kramlinger also had his own simple criteria, stating that “when a company calls 
itself a learning organization, it is committing to at least some of the following 
assumptions:” 
• Everyone can be a source of useful ideas. 
• The people closest to the problem usually have the best ideas. 
• Learning flows up as well as down in the organization. 
• Nothing is sacred (except the governing vision and values). 
• The process of open dialogue improves ideas. 
• The more information people can access the better. 
• New ideas are valuable. 
• A mistake is simply an opportunity to learn.119 
Kramlinger also asserted that a learning organization will educate its leaders to 
listen more effectively, work to connect with and develop subordinates, understand that 
some of the best solutions come from the factory floor, not the boardroom, and that trainers 
should “adopt policies that encourage and reward widespread and spontaneous 
learning.”120  
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3. Creating Initial Progress 
When it comes to building a learning organization, many leaders do not know 
where to begin. While organizations may find some short-term success in the form of 
improved training or organizational learning, they struggle to build a learning organization 
because the bulk of their efforts are dedicated to the process of learning, not the structure 
of learning. Organizations often look backwards for answers, lessons-learned and after-
action reports are excellent tools, but it is the ability to look forward and understand a 
changing environment that leads an organization to adapt and survive. In his article, How 
Can Organizations Learn Faster, Edgar Schein explained that the challenge leaders used 
to face was managing change, and the new challenge is managing surprise. Schein argues 
that organizations that want to survive must learn to adapt faster than their competitors, 
and to do this an organization needs “insight”. This can be accomplished by improved 
communication between different groups and levels of a company and developing 
mechanisms for continuous learning. Change management groups made up of individuals 
from different departments, steering committees and task forces can also help to change 
course and provide insight so that an organization can change direction. The first step for 
any organization that has a problem, is to acknowledge that a problem exists. Once that 
acknowledgement has been made, an organization can begin solving problems and 
developing solutions quickly. Committees and task forces can get to work solving problems 
in as little as a few days or even weeks, especially if they are allowed to work rapidly for 
days/weeks at a time uninterrupted, instead of the often used one-meeting-per-week routine 
many teams are often held to. Meetings can also be held offsite for a few days if it helps 
eliminate distractions and generate perspective. Regardless of the decisions that follow, 
acknowledging a problem and getting to work on it quickly are the necessary first steps for 
any organization wishing to improve. 
Garvin concedes that learning organizations are built over a long period of time, 
and the ones that have become successful examples “are the products of carefully cultivated 
attitudes, commitments, and management processes that have accrued slowly and steadily 
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over time.”121 He also points out that any organization wanting to begin this transformation 
can take some modest immediate steps to get started. His recommended first step is to 
“foster an environment that is conducive to learning,” which allows time to think about 
strategic plans, focus on mission, reflect, analyze, assess, and question existing practices.122 
The key to this step is that management needs to make time for it to happen. Without 
scheduled time or space to complete these activities, learning is often diminished if teams 
feel pressured or rushed. A second step is to break down boundaries between different 
groups and levels of individuals and teams. “Boundaries inhibit the flow of information; 
they keep individuals and groups isolated and reinforce preconceptions.”123 There are 
strong benefits to learning vertically and laterally, as this helps to eliminate blind spots and 
helps to build the insight that Schein stressed was so important. 
In addition to insight, Kramlinger also stresses that an early step to becoming a 
learning organization is building self-sufficiency within the ranks. This is accomplished by 
teaching managers how to develop subordinates, so they have confidence and can learn 
and make their own decisions. A learning organization often builds networks of volunteers 
that serve as learning consultants, which are individuals that serve as liaisons between 
front-line workers and leadership. Learning consultants help to promote and elevate 
solutions that come from the factory floor, which come from the individuals closest to the 
problems whose solutions are often the most effective due to their direct hands-on 
experience.124 
 THE THREE TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Despite some overlap, a learning organization and organizational learning are not 
synonymous, although a learning organization will have a strong understanding of 
organizational learning. Organizational theorists Argyris, Schön, and Bateson pioneered 
what are today known as the three different types of organizational learning: 
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Figure 5. Learning Loops.125 
Table 5. Three Types of Organizational Learning. 126 
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1. Single-Loop Learning  
Single-loop learning focuses mostly on actions, specifically the need for individuals 
to learn new skills through assimilation and repetition.127 In a single-loop framework, 
conditions or errors are detected which necessitate a response, at which point the individual 
inputs a modification or correction to remedy the situation. In one of Argyris’ examples, a 
thermostat senses a change in temperature, recognizes the difference between expected and 
actual outcomes, and answers by heating or cooling in response, bringing the room to its 
assigned temperature. The same logic can be applied to many routine jobs with repetitive 
tasks. 
While single-loop learning addresses the “how” in most workplace scenarios, it 
seldom answers the “why” behind them. While single-loop is excellent at removing 
symptoms, it often fails to eliminate causes, and is usually characterized as reactive vice 
proactive. Single-loop learning is still essential in all organizations, especially as 
refinement and improvement teach and enable a workforce to operate more efficiently with 
fewer errors as it gains experience. Single-loop learning often leads to small adjustments 
and quick fixes, but it does not question underlying assumptions, which is why additional 
learning types are required.  
2. Double-Loop Learning  
Double-loop learning takes the extra steps of questioning underlying assumptions 
and attempts to learn and improve from mistakes.128 Double-loop learning examines 
whether existing practices, policies or procedures could be getting in the way, and forces 
an organization to challenge their existing assumptions. Double-loop learning helps an 
organization learn from mistakes while making changes to avoid repeating them. “With 
double-loop learning, organizational members must recognize the underlying patterns of 
their thinking and behavior, and in doing so, they fundamentally reshape their thoughts and 
actions. With this form of learning, error detection still occurs, but members challenge their 
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mental models and assumptions to try and understand the existing organizational policies 
or structures that help to bring these errors about.”129 
According to Eilertsen and London, double-loop learning does not evolve from 
single-loop learning, as they are two different learning types, and both critically important 
in their respective situations. Where single-loop is most appropriate in routine and 
repetitive daily tasks, double-loop is more appropriate in more complex and unique 
scenarios, both of which are commonly faced simultaneously by many organizations. 
3. Triple-Loop Learning  
Triple-loop learning means that an organization does not just understand how to 
adapt, but it also has learned how to learn, what to learn, and has a stronger self-awareness 
of itself and surrounding environment. It is a deeper understanding of why an organization 
operates in a specific way.130 
The term “triple-loop learning” gained increased attention and popularity with the 
release of Organizational Learning: A Critical Review in 2003.131 Triple-loop learning is 
to organizational learning what systems thinking is to Senge’s learning organization; it is 
what “links all of the local learning units into a unified learning organization… 
organizational members learn how to tap the collective knowledge embedded in various 
parts of the organization, and by learning how to learn over time, organizational members 
discover what facilitates or inhibits their learning and can thus produce new strategies to 
develop their knowledge.”132 
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 LEARNING ORGANIZATION WORK WRITTEN IN THE CONTEXT OF 
DOD 
1. Previous Navy Reform Attempts  
The Navy in recent years has stressed its desire to become more like a learning 
organization. In 2009, Chief of Naval Personnel Vice Admiral John C. Harvey said: 
A learning organization is one that cultivates change through its people. It 
adapts by encouraging them to be creative and share ideas. I believe our 
Navy is a learning organization. As part of my recent trip to the CENTCOM 
AOR, I was struck by the vast array of experience and skills our Sailors are 
acquiring executing their missions. As a learning organization we must 
institutionalize this knowledge along with the other critical lessons our 
Sailors are learning every day while executing our more traditional 
missions. To accomplish the required learning, and to ensure we begin 
evolving, we must first ensure we have a healthy learning environment 
underpinned by concrete practices and supportive leadership.133 
Regarding the importance of psychological safety, one of the main tenets of a 
learning organization, Vice Admiral McCollum’s 2019 report noted how a lack of 
psychological safety “inhibits employee trust and voice, thereby limiting feedback and 
learning, and once marginalized, organizational effectiveness and mission accomplishment 
decreases.”134 His team went on to observe: 
A common bureaucratic response to accidents, mistakes, and lack of 
performance, is to instill new or additional reporting requirements and 
oversight (structural improvements). However, absent improvements to the 
human interactions within the process, organizational 1earning is impeded. 
Structural changes can provide some measure of improved performance, but 
the results are typically sub-optimal without concurrent enhancements to 
the "human factor." A lack of trust, psychological safety, and other pre-
conditions can cause employees to not report or under-report mistakes.135 
The idea that the Navy can become a learning organization is not a new one, and 
some would even say the Navy’s successfully made the transition before. Trent Hone, 
author of the 2018 book, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. 
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Navy, 1898–1945, explained that his main thesis is that the U.S. Navy at the beginning of 
the twentieth century became, what we call today, a learning organization.136 Hone 
mentioned one of the points that struck him the most was how adaptable naval officers 
were at the start of the twentieth century. The Navy of one hundred years ago had “officers 
who developed experience and skills in many different specialties—surface ships, 
submarines, aviation, and politics—that together created an integrated fleet. Just as many 
development teams today encourage broad expertise across a variety of domains and 
technologies, the U.S. Navy of the early twentieth century encouraged officers to develop 
familiarity with different aspects of naval warfare.”137 Hone also implies that the answers 
to building a learning culture can be found by examining several early twentieth century 
naval examples, in which the Navy was able to foster self-organization, leveraging 
constraints and establishing clear goals. One of his most pointed examples is the 
transformation of naval surface warfare doctrine immediately after the attack at Pearl 
Harbor. As to the question regarding how the Navy was able to transform, Hone offered: 
The traditional answer is that the shock of Pearl Harbor forced the Navy out 
of its stodgy conservatism. The devastating strike of Japanese carrier 
airpower not only sank the battle fleet but forced the Navy to leave behind 
the “gun club” philosophy that had dominated its tactical thought in the 
interwar period (1919–39). “Battleship admirals” had failed to appreciate 
the nature of the technological changes taking place around them, had 
restricted experimentation, and had inhibited the development of modern 
approaches; the raid on Pearl Harbor freed the Navy of its shackles. It is a 
compelling narrative that has appeared in popular histories, authoritative 
analyses, and rigorously researched articles. It is also incorrect.  
The true story of how the Navy rapidly transformed is a remarkable one of 
innovative change in the face of dynamic technologies, budgetary 
constraints, and wartime stress. In the early years of the twentieth century, 
the Navy transitioned from a traditional institution to a modern, professional 
organization. This change was triggered by a new concept of American 
naval power and a revised view of the role of a modern naval officer. New 
approaches to officer education and new organizational structures followed, 
along with processes for experimenting with new ideas, gathering feedback 
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from the experience, and continually improving. These processes were core 
aspects of the Navy; as officers worked to understand how best to 
coordinate a modern fleet in combat, they collaboratively refined their 
tactics and kept their minds open to the possibility of new approaches, 
triggering a series of innovations.138 
Viewing the U.S. Navy as what Hone calls a complex adaptive system (CAS), like 
a learning organization, understands the diversity of human systems and the role they play 
in the larger part of a team. Hone also examined the relationship between human systems, 
and complex systems, which are a shaped by constraints and historical circumstances. 
According to Hone, “constraints are essential to CAS; they govern the dynamic processes 
that lead to increasingly sophisticated organization and specialization, and channel the 
behavior of individuals in the system and focus their efforts, which can foster the 
development of new approaches.”139  
The Navy of the early twentieth century demonstrated an ability to learn, 
innovate, and evolve that places it at the forefront of modern ideas regarding 
management, organizational structure, and innovation. Numerous theories 
have been advanced about how best to foster sustained organizational 
learning. Over a century ago, the Navy introduced a successful approach to 
harnessing new technologies advantageously in an extremely dynamic 
environment. It conducted regular experiments, engaged in cycles of 
learning, and continuously improved. During World War II, the pace of 
these cycles accelerated, and the Navy rapidly transformed. Victory in the 
Pacific was a result of the Navy’s ability to foster evolutionary changes in 
its doctrine, an ability that had been developed and refined over prior 
decades…which has also been credited for enabling the Surface Warfare 
community to rapidly transform in what has been called one of the most 
innovative changes in history.140 
Future Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Ernest J. King was an early 
product of these constraints, as they created an environment that awarded those with 
ambition and talent in a new system of promotion, emphasizing the importance of learning. 
Shortly after King graduated in this new system, some of his most memorable peers 
followed soon after. “His contemporaries were the leaders who were, again like him, to see 
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the Navy through World War II. Harold R. Stark, a future CNO, graduated in 1903; 
William F. Halsey graduated a year later; Chester W. Nimitz was a graduate of the class of 
1905; and Frank J. Fletcher and Raymond A. Spruance followed in 1906.”141 
Around this same period, the Navy demonstrated that it clearly understood the 
benefits of organizational learning, choosing to establish the Naval War College (NWC) in 
Newport, Rhode Island in 1884. The college’s early presidents, Admirals Stephen B. Luce, 
and Alfred T. Mahan, reconceptualized the American naval officer. Luce understood that 
naval officers needed the highest levels of proficiency in strategy and military science, and 
that a broad field of knowledge requires study and reflection. Mahan stressed that naval 
warfare was an art that could be taught, and worked to enhance and improve the school’s 
curriculum, emphasizing contextual analysis and collaborative learning.”142 
The officers produced by the Naval Academy and NWC during this period were 
extraordinary. These naval officers and their follow-on subordinates understood the value 
of sharing information, “demonstrating that a resilient officer network was emerging in the 
combat zone. Officers were sharing lessons better, learning from each other more readily, 
and refining their skills more rapidly. Stable formations and more regular conferences 
allowed the collaborative development of new approaches that capitalized on the lessons 
promulgated by Nimitz and his type commands.”143 It was also during this period more 
dramatic innovations began to take shape, such as the 1943 Pacific Fleet Tactical Orders 
and Doctrine, also known as the PAC-10, and the Combat Information Center (CIC), which 
were previously not prioritized prior to naval officers understanding their value in 
combat.144 Naval leaders also realized the value of rotating experienced officers from the 
Pacific Fleet to other parts of the world, where lessons learned and recent and relevant 
experiences could be shared and discussed. 
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A lesson from World War II also illustrates how historical circumstances help to 
further define constraints, like a starting point and a finish line, which further shape the 
constraints of a complex system. The relationship between human and complex systems 
and how they shape constraints also partially explain why the U.S. Navy has historically 
practiced successful innovation during wartime, but stagnation during peacetime. During 
wartime, funding increases, more command discretion is delegated to subordinate field 
grade officers, bureaucracies are less restrictive, constraints less often enforced, and 
experts are more able to bear viable solutions. During peacetime, decisions become more 
centralized, funding is reduced, leaders compete for current and future resources, and 
innovation declines.145 A similar phenomenon occurs when the United States is engaged 
in smaller conflicts, where the United States has simply been too dominant and too slow to 
learn and adapt to these regional opponents. 
While funding and resources have always been a challenge, the Navy of the early 
twentieth century was able to maximize its learning resources, specifically from its 
leadership.  
In the years before World War I, the Navy fostered a learning environment; 
during the interwar period, that environment was maintained, creating 
fertile ground for new ideas and dissenting opinions. Certain officers were 
particularly effective in this milieu; one was Raymond A. Spruance. When 
he taught tactics at the Naval War College, between 1935 and 1937, his 
“primary contribution was to set an atmosphere in which both students and 
instructors were free to express their opinions, to innovate, and to 
experiment.” Chester W. Nimitz was another. The officers who served with 
Nimitz later remembered him as an effective and disciplined leader who 
helped foster collaborative decision making.146 
The pattern that emerges is that while funding and resources are often reduced 
during peacetime, learning institutions have the opportunity to maximize their potential by 
dramatically examining wartime strategy, tactics, technology, and policy. The advantage 
the early twentieth century Navy had was that it was relatively small during the interwar 
period. The Navy’s then-small group of officers had what Senge would call a mental 
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model, for them it was “a shared mental frame that operated as a set of enabling constraints. 
It was based on common approaches, like reliance on individual initiative, the conference 
method, and the estimate of the situation.”147 This model was effectively broken shortly 
after the war began, as the sudden influx of reserve officers brought individuals with 
different mindsets. Maintaining preexisting mental models and shared visions was 
increasingly difficult due to the demand to develop warfighting officers quickly. 
While Hone’s work emphasizes the early twentieth century, failure to adapt and 
learn from mistakes remains a twenty-first century problem. In his 2017 Strategic 
Readiness Review, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer wrote the following while citing 
Senge’s work: 
A learning organization is an enterprise that encourages, and ultimately 
embraces, learning through systems thinking, personal mastery, mental 
models, shared vision, and team learning. Faced with a dynamic 
environment, a learning culture is critical to ensuring adaptability of the 
organization. A culture that makes people eager to understand risk enables 
early identification of systemic risks and behaviors before problems occur. 
It is a culture that embraces a willingness to investigate, analyze, assess, and 
learn from mistakes.148 
The Strategic Review determined that over the past thirty years, naval readiness 
suffered not because of a single policy or leadership decision, but is more a product of: 
“the cumulative effects of well-meaning decisions designed to achieve 
short-term operational effectiveness and efficiencies have often produced 
unintended negative consequences which, in turn, degraded necessary long-
term operational capability. Simultaneously, Navy leaders accumulated 
greater and greater risk in order to accomplish the missions at hand, which 
unintentionally altered the Navy’s culture and, at levels above the Navy, 
distorted perceptions of the readiness of the fleet.”149 
The report concluded that “training initiatives and time to conduct training were 
traded away to meet pressing short-term operational needs, which further contributed to 
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the overall readiness decline and increased stress on the crews.”150 The report also 
recommended four broad strategic recommendations, one of which was: 
Become a True Learning Organization. Navy history is replete with reports 
and investigations that contain like findings regarding past collisions, 
groundings, and other operational incidents. The repeated recommendations 
and calls for change belie the belief that the Navy always learns from its 
mistakes. Navy leadership at all levels must foster a culture of learning and 
create the structures and processes that fully embrace this commitment.151 
More evident than the actual report is the stark reality that other nations, specifically 
China, have made better use of their time to learn and innovate than the United States in 
certain regions. Thirty years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed, which left the United States 
as the world’s only remaining superpower. Some immediately pointed to China as a nation 
with rising potential, but unfortunately our Navy, along with the DOD, seem to have been 
caught unprepared for the global presence that China has recently asserted. Chinese buildup 
in the South China Sea has made steady progress since the early 1990s, erecting islands 
through the use of land reclamation vessels and the construction of several military 
installations within the past ten years.152 These recently constructed islands and facilities 
also reside in a region where a large percentage of the world’s maritime trade transits 
through, giving them a premier strategic location both militarily and economically. These 
long-developed and carefully planned installations provide the Chinese government and 
military with unquestionable geographic and tactical advantages over the United States and 
its allies. 
Similarly, Russia has reasserted itself in the Arctic, bringing with it a nuclear 
icebreaking capability to operate in a region the United States cannot match.153 The United 
States has struggled to learn and keep pace with these fast-rising rivals. 
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Domestically, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the Navy’s more recent 
attempts to become a learning organization have been met with tough realities in several 
warfare communities and programs. In a 2018 appearance before the U.S. House Armed 
Services Committee, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 
Congressman Michael R. Turner said that he was deeply concerned by the recent increase 
in aviation mishaps.154 According to a December 1, 2020, report by the National 
Commission on Military Aviation Safety, 224 lives, 186 aircraft and $11.6 billion have 
been lost due to aviation mishaps between fiscal years 2013-2020. The summaries of both 
reports show that both Class A and Class B mishaps have remained largely the same over 
a ten-year period: 
 
Figure 6. Class A and B Mishap Rates.155 
Perhaps more surprising, was that the number of Class C mishaps had actually 
increased over the same period: 
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Figure 7. Class C Mishap Rates.156 
 
Figure 8. Class C Aggregate Mishap Estimated Derived Costs (in 
Millions) by Service for Fiscal Years 2007-2018.157 
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There are several explanations as to why aviation mishap rates have remained 
largely unchanged for several years. Aging aircraft, the inability to procure new or 
refurbish existing airframes, and the lack of consistent and predictable funding have all 
contributed to the lack of improvement.158 Modern aircraft also cost more than their 
predecessors, incidents are more expensive, which means more of these incidents meet the 
threshold to be categorized as mishaps that would not have been categorized as such in 
previous generation aircraft. 
We have determined from the Naval Safety Center and the Center for Naval 
Analyses, that damage sustained during maintenance is the leading cause of 
these mishaps, with the analysis pointing towards maintainers that are less 
experienced. The reduced experience is being addressed by doubling the 
length of orders for shore-based apprentice maintainers from two to four 
years, enabling them to gain additional experience and qualifications.159  
Recent reports from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
also highlight some additional challenges. Navy shipyard maintenance has continued to 
decline for several different reasons. Ships have been delivered with defects due to gaps in 
the Navy’s delivery policy, along with the often-used option to defer maintenance and 
extend deployments due to operational requirements. Ship’s low crew levels, performance, 
conditions of facilities and equipment, and failure to modernize have all contributed to the 
Navy’s inability to maintain these ships once they have been received.160 
Additional GAO reports have found similar issues in acquisition. The Navy has 
struggled to meet deadlines, highlighting that “aircraft mission capable rates generally did 
not meet goals and the cost of sustaining selected weapons systems varied widely.”161 The 
consensus across several platforms is that procurement is taking longer, and little 
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improvement has been made in the acquisition process, where deliveries are routinely 
behind schedule, and over budget.  
 The most glaring example that the Navy has struggled to learn was during the 
summer of 2017, in which the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain both collided with 
commercial vessels in what were preventable incidents. Seventeen sailors lost their lives. 
During a 2019 appearance before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Navy leaders 
were questioned by Congresswoman Elaine Luria, an ex-Navy Commander. During her 
opening remarks, she stated that “we continue to be incapable of properly manning, training 
and equipping our surface forces…for nearly two decades, we prioritized efficiency over 
effectiveness.”162 Naval leaders testified that they were aware of most of the issues in the 
Navy’s 7th Fleet where the collisions occurred, but were often forced to make difficult 
decisions due to the demand for ships and an increase in operational mission requirements. 
Over a period of ten years, the Navy has been unable to reduce ship collisions and 
aircraft mishaps. Acquisitions and maintenance are only taking longer with each successive 
year. These are the manifestations of not learning. There are several factors, inconsistent 
funding, policy, strategy, all point to valid reasons why the Navy has struggled, but they 
also show an inability to adapt to a changing environment. 
The point of these examples is not to place blame, but to merely point out that 
despite some encouraging progress the Navy has made regarding organizational learning, 
our Navy has more work to do in becoming a better learning organization.  
Becoming a learning organization is clearly a top priority for several of the Navy’s 
top leaders. In 2016, CNO Admiral Richardson discussed the importance of high-velocity 
learning while visiting the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Admiral Richardson 
emphasized his vision of a Navy that learns from the bottom-up, and building a learning 
culture “characterized by positive attitudes and the desire to constantly seek self-
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improvement…recognizing the need to take advantage of the various talents and 
perspectives provided by the newest members of an organization.”163 The Navy has also 
taken recent steps to modernize its institutional training and education, adding programs 
such as Sailor 2025 which includes Ready Relevant Learning (RRL),164 and hosted events 
such as the Career Development Symposium (CDS) at various military regions and 
installations.165 The first line in the 2018 Education for Seapower Report states that 
“continuous learning—and sharing hard-won knowledge—represents a combat-proven 
key to victory for our naval services.”166 Continuous learning and organizational learning 
are consistently referenced throughout the document. The Navy has made progress in 
several of its learning processes, but work remains to improve the learning structure that 
is needed to support and sustain the types of learning the Navy needs to continue adapting 
to a changing global environment. 
2. Sister Services and Maneuver Warfare 
The Navy is not the only branch of the United States military to attempt becoming 
more like a learning organization. The practice of organizational learning was imbedded in 
the maneuver warfare movements of both the United States Marine Corps and Army. Many 
Marines focus on maneuver warfare as an approach to how tactics can be applied in combat, 
but the battlefield application is only a small part of the greater strategy. The history of 
maneuver warfare is one of bottom-up military innovation that teaches leaders that there is 
always more than one solution to a problem, and leaders who emphasize thinking and 
learning will often present the best solutions.167  
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Under the leadership of General Al Gray, early maneuverists argued how a strategy 
of maneuver warfare was historically proven to be far more effective than attrition warfare, 
noting how smaller militaries were often forced to think harder, fight smarter, and adapt to 
changing disadvantages.168 Maneuver warfare allowed subordinate commanders the 
freedom to make real-time adjustments to changing conditions, while staying within the 
intent of the higher headquarters’ operational objectives. It began as “a movement focused 
on helping Marines learn how to think better about complex issues (not what to think) and 
reinforcing the importance of learning as a lifetime activity.”169 It also led to the drafting 
of new ideas, and formalizing them into a manual in what would become Fleet Marine 
Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1) Warfighting, the first of many organizational documents the 
Marine Corps would produce. It also led to the establishment of the Marine Corps 
University (MCU) in 1989 at Quantico, Virginia.170  
General Gray’s tenure as Commandant marked the beginning of an organizational 
culture shift for the Marine Corps. While warfighting doctrine was still emphasized, 
Marines were also encouraged to remain flexible and adaptable to changing scenarios. 
MCU’s Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) has since evolved into the Expeditionary 
Warfare School (EWS), where Marines are taught to embrace creativity and share 
knowledge and experiences so that they can improve and strengthen doctrine vice being 
bound to it without flexibility.  
The Marine Corps’ level of commitment to education and collaboration has helped 
to construct an organizational culture that most resembles a learning organization. Marine 
Corps leaders have voiced their commitment to a “culture of learning”, seeing it as essential 
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to meet operational requirements in the twenty-first century.171 Maneuver warfare has also 
enjoyed a bit of a renaissance, as Major General William F. Mullen III, while in command 
of Marine Corps Training and Education Command reinforced the benefits of maneuver 
warfare and how focusing on personal and professional development, building mature and 
intelligent leaders, developing unit cohesion and competence, are far more important than 
merely focusing on material items and new technologies.172 General Mullen also ensured 
the release of Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 7 (MCDP 7) on Learning. “MCDP 7 — 
the first doctrinal publication the service has issued since 2001 — is designed to motivate 
Marines to personally assess where they can improve and understand the ‘why’ behind the 
significance of learning.”173  
Like the Marine Corps, the Army and a few of its reformers found some 
encouraging success during their attempts to transform their organizational learning and 
enterprise structure beginning in the 1980s. Army reformers had seen firsthand how war 
was becoming more lethal and hazardous, and how the United States was relying too 
heavily on innovation and technological advances as a tactical advantage. This led to the 
establishment of the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (AMS) at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. AMS “developed a curriculum that blended studies in theory, 
doctrine, and history to prepare students for operational warfare. In addition to using 
classical texts in military history, the school also incorporated studies of Soviet military 
theory to broaden the conception of operational art and facilitate its transmission to the 
operating forces.”174 
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In a 1991 appearance before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, former 
Senator Gary Hart testified that the Army’s unprecedented success in the Gulf War were 
in part due to the achievements made by graduates of the Army’s School of AMS: 
Mr. Chairman, some conclusions are obvious. We won. We won with very 
few casualties. And we won largely through maneuver warfare, a central 
theme as Colonel Boyd has said within the military reform movement. 
Based on this foundation, several lessons become apparent. First, the 
principles of military reform where they were adopted, have been adopted, 
have proved sound. Drawing on military history, military reformers have 
argued for two decades that, for winning in combat, as Colonel Boyd has 
said, people are most important, ideas are second, and weapons are third… 
The importance of good military education is the third lesson about people. 
A major force behind the development of our excellent maneuver warfare 
campaign plan, were the graduates of the Army's School of Advanced 
Military Studies at Ft. Leavenworth. This school differs from virtually all 
of our other military institutions, schools, and colleges, in that it focuses on 
developing military judgment largely through study of military history and 
exercises in making military decisions. By contrast, the focus still at most 
of our schools remains too much on rote learning of processes, procedures, 
and formats.175 
The strengths of maneuver warfare in both services are characterized by the value 
they place on common notions, such as decentralization, creativity, adaptability, and 
innovation. A culture of maneuver warfare is similar to that of a learning organization, 
because both understand the value of a strong learning infrastructure and the importance 
of processes such as after-action reports, hot groups, and feedback loops, all of which help 
to capture lessons learned and share them with as wide an audience as possible. These types 
of processes also help to ensure that learning is maximized; not localized only to the 
individuals that were present at the time. Maneuver warfare focuses on an opponent’s 
center of gravity (COG), emphasizing mission accomplishment over blindly following 
specific processes, as “letting processes become a substitute for good judgment can lead to 
well-executed, terrible decisions - or worse, to stagnation and frustration.”176 
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In his book, Hope is Not a Method (1997), co-authored with Michael Harper, 
General (Ret.) Gordon Sullivan discussed the Army’s rapid transformation during the 
1990s, claiming that “the army had transformed itself into a learning organization, maybe 
the foremost learning organization in the world.”177 Army leadership was familiar with 
Senge’s work and had a working understanding of the building blocks and disciplines that 
Senge had developed. The Army was also becoming more like a learning organization 
through the utilization of the maneuver warfare concept used toward warfighting. 
General Schoomaker, during his 2004 testimony to the U.S. House Armed Services 
Committee, testified that the Army has primarily held a doctrine-based focus for the 
preceding 50 years, but under his watch as Chief of Staff, the Army was trying to transform 
itself. Schoomaker stated that the United States needs an Army that knows how to think, 
use instincts, and experience, and develop a more flexible doctrine from which to 
operate.178 
The strength of a football team is not the play that is called in the huddle 
and how well everybody knows the playbook. The strength of the team is 
when you get to the line of scrimmage and the ball gets snapped, what 
happens when everything changes? That is the difference, and that is the 
kind of Army we need. We have to have a common basic starting point, but, 
boy, once the ball has snapped, you know, we have to have people that 
understand the intent, understand what the end state is supposed to be and 
understand how they can contribute.179 
Schoomaker also emphasized that the Army that would be needed in the future is a 
force that has both organizational and intellectual agility, that can anticipate and create 
solutions while progressing forward. 
 
177 Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can 
Learn from America’s Army (New York: Broadway Books, 2010), ix. 
178  Army Transformation: Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) 
(statement by General Schoomaker). 
179 James G. Alden, Amber L. Hopeman, and Jodi A. Neff, “Transforming Change in the Military: A 
Systems Approach” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 23, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3491. See also Peter Schoomaker, U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Armed 
Services, Hearings on Army Transformation, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15 and 21, 2004, 61. 
65 
More recently in 2017, Major General Kern, Provost, Army University, released its 
inaugural Journal of Military Learning (JML), further emphasizing a career-long learning 
model that meets the needs of all soldiers and DOD civilians: 
Warfare is and will remain the most difficult of human endeavors, and in 
the multifaceted world of today, developing soldiers and civilians with the 
technical, professional, and leadership skills to “win in a complex world” is 
more important than ever. The Army has never stood still when it comes to 
improving training and education, but recently Army leadership has 
recognized that the rate of change in the operating environment necessitates 
a true transformation in the way we approach learning in the Army to ensure 
readiness of our forces now and far into the future.180 
In the same journal issue, in an article titled The Changing Face of Military 
Learning, the authors also identified a need for transformation, arguing that “military 
personnel require an expanded set of competencies, higher levels of nuanced skills such as 
critical thinking and emotional intelligence, and more efficient and agile pathways to 
expertise, and that achieving these outcomes depends, at least in part, on revising the 
learning military enterprise.”181 To achieve this, one of the recommendations presented by 
the authors is to “foster a learning culture at the organizational level. By definition, 
‘learning organizations’ are those companies or agencies that continuously transform 
themselves to maintain relevance within changing conditions, respond nimbly to the 
newest threats, and capitalize upon emerging opportunities.”182 
Sean Hannah and Paul Lester at the Department of Behavioral Sciences, United 
States Military Academy, West Point, made several observations in their 2009 report, A 
Multilevel Approach to Building and Leading Learning Organizations.183 Hannah and 
Lester highlight how F.M. Andrews concluded that “creative potential was only related to 
 
180 Maj. Gen. John S. Kern, U.S. Army, “What Is Army University Supposed to Do and How Is It 
Going So Far?,” Army University Press, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-
Learning. 
181 Sae Schatz et al., “The Changing Face of Military Learning,” Army University Press, April 2017, 
78, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/Journal-of-Military-Learning-
Archives/April-2017-Edition/The-Changing-Face-of-Military-Learning/. 
182 Schatz et al., 86. 
183 Sean T. Hannah and Paul B. Lester, “A Multilevel Approach to Building and Leading Learning 
Organizations,” The Leadership Quarterly, Leadership and Organizational Learning, 20, no. 1 (February 
2009): 34–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2008.11.003. 
66 
innovation when workers attributed their environment to be safe and encouraging.”184 
Additional research by Nemanich and Vera “found that cultures that promote learning and 
offer psychological safety and openness to diverse opinions promote both exploration of 
new knowledge and refinement of existing knowledge.”185  
Spain, Mohundro and Banks also highlighted the importance of developing 
intellectual human capital (IHC) within the Army, which is essential for the United States 
to achieve the intellectual overmatch it desires over its rivals.  
Intellectual human capital becomes more central to winning as security 
environments become increasingly difficult, especially as officers rise in 
rank and the complexity of their tasks increase. As technology and industry 
dominated the wars of the 20th century, intellectual human capital will 
likely decide many of the world’s future security issues. Army officers are 
America’s “boots on the ground” senior leaders in the middle of rapidly 
changing environments. Army officers must have the intellectual agility not 
only to survive, but to thrive in such environments.186 
Recruiting and retaining the Soldiers with the highest levels of cognitive ability can 
help to generate more IHC. “Cognitive ability enables intellectual agility (i.e., the ability 
to understand and apply many conceptual things simultaneously) and intellectual 
adaptability (i.e., the ability to stay ahead of the rate of situational and environmental 
changes).”187 
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Table 6. Defining Intellectual Human Capital188 
 
 
3. Joint Forces and International Examples  
Just as a learning organization supports a culture of bottom-up learning and 
solutions, some of the strongest learning organization examples are the ones that start 
small, and gradually expand. Special Operations Forces (SOF) often operate 
independently, through a decentralized command structure that requires its company-level 
leaders to solve problems at the operational level, often without immediate support of its 
superiors. Schultz conducted a case study of Task Force (TF) 714 in Iraq, noting how the 
unit was able to adapt and transform, later defeating the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) forces 
between 2006-2009. He credits TF 714’s success to forging alliances with military and 
civilian intelligence agencies, helping to create a joint interagency task force (JIATF), 
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which through interdependence and cooperation would establish “problem-solving 
methods capable of deciphering AQI’s networks.”189 TF 714’s success was largely due to 
shedding its top-down style of command, understanding that the existing hierarchy in place 
was too slow to adapt to AQI’s decentralized networks. 
Individuals and teams closest to the fight were best positioned to decide and 
act decisively. The velocity and volume of decisions needing to be made 
exceeded the ability of even the most gifted leader. Empowerment of those 
at the operational levels was indispensable. Agency and empowerment were 
critical enablers…The action arm of the JIATF, the operational units, was 
coordinated with a robust intelligence capability drawn from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and other agencies—
intelligence led the way. To learn and adapt, TF 714 amassed information 
and knowledge about a new problem set—a complex, clandestine, and 
networked enemy empowered by information age technology. The task 
force achieved intelligence dominance over AQI. 
To foster cross-organization ties, cross-fertilization of new ideas, and 
dissemination of new knowledge to respond to AQI’s complex challenges, 
the JIATF established an operating environment based on cooperation, 
trust, and interdependence among its interagency members. Several 
innovative procedures and mechanisms were adopted to facilitate this 
environment. Each enhanced the capacity of the JIATF to act decisively, 
with speed and precision, to maneuver inside AQI’s networks fast enough 
to seriously dismantle those networks from the inside out.190 
TF 714 developed its ability to recognize that decisions made at the top slowed the 
execution and actions taken by subordinate leaders, often reducing their effectiveness, and 
limiting their ability to respond to changing environments in real-time. “TF 714’s 
transformation from a highly compartmented organization augmented by a JIATF had an 
extraordinary impact on its operational tempo. In August 2004, the task force executed 18 
raids. Two years later, in August 2006, they were up to 300 raids a month.”191 “By adopting 
the characteristics of a learning organization and transforming itself, TF 714 was able to 
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sustain an industrial-strength counterterrorism operational tempo of 300 raids a month 
between 2006 and 2009.”192 SOF units tend to have a better understanding of how 
decentralized decision making, adaptability, and knowledge sharing lead to the most 
effective solutions when faced with constantly changing environments, and some of these 
best practices can serve as models for other small units and organizations to build from. 
International and joint forces also tend to better understand the concepts of a 
learning organization and why they are beneficial, because these units often rely on 
knowledge sharing and communication with each other to adapt to their own changing 
environments. In 2000, the 42nd Annual Conference of the International Military Testing 
Association met in Edinburgh, Scotland, from November 7-9. One of the papers discussed 
titled, Creating a Learning Organization (2000), was written by Annette G. Baisden of the 
United States Naval Education and Training Professional Development and Technology 
Center. She concluded that during a time of unprecedented change, organizations will need 
to continually adapt by reinventing themselves, establishing a learning culture built on trust 
where individuals and teams are encouraged to experiment and take risks. She also stressed 
that organizations need to find ways to remove unnecessary rules and control, advocating 
for a flatter organizational structure where possible.193 
In 2005, NATO formed an Educators Development Working Group (ED WG), with 
the goal of transforming legacy teaching methods of former Soviet authoritarian 
institutions into more democratic systems so they could train leaders better able to handle 
the twenty-first century. The ED WG chose to ground its work in the then-current 
understandings of adult-learners, with the requirement to develop life-long learners in 
rapidly changing societies during a time of information overload, so that they can construct 
knowledge & wisdom moving forward (focused on two main points of constructivism and 
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connectivism).194 The team concluded that one of the critical principles for sustainable 
learning that can successfully challenge existing legacy learning methods, was the 
promotion of life-long learning in the leaders of these nations, encouraging multinational 
cooperation and promoting the exchange of ideas with partnering countries. 
 THINKING EFFECTIVELY FIRST 
Navy Captain (Ret.) Wayne Hughes, former Dean Emeritus of NPS, renowned 
professor and giant among naval strategists, often stressed that the ultimate objective of 
naval tactical warfare is to “fire effectively first.”195 Augier and Barrett cite Hughes 
emphasis to “develop leaders who are intellectually adaptive and capable of identifying 
strategic trends, understanding and solving complex problems in an interdisciplinary 
manner, and thinking effectively first.”196  
Thinking effectively first requires cultivating the right mental habits, first 
by prioritizing problem framing (and reframing) while actively seeking 
alternative and opposing views to prove our own hypothesis incorrect. Next, 
to think critically, constructively, strategically, and about the process of 
thinking itself to improve our intellectual adaptability and be learners that 
are always eager to extend our knowledge, whether through reading, 
experimentation, debates, or otherwise. Finally, to encourage active open-
mindedness and intuition, and inspire imagination and curiosity to inform 
judgment and integrate analytical, intuitive, and synthesizing ways of 
understanding Navy and warfighter problems.197 
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The learning culture that Hughes, Augier, and Barrett highlight is precisely what 
military leaders have been calling for, with a strong emphasis on continuous learning and 
educational infrastructure that prepares today’s leaders for tomorrow’s challenges.198 
1. Long Range Planning and Small Course Corrections 
Changes made in the 1920s to requirements for command positions were 
intended simply to aid the navy’s fledgling aviation community, but as a 
result, by the late 1930s the navy had become the most aviation-minded in 
the world.199 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff released their Strategic Vision and Guidance for PME and 
Guidance in May of 2020, stating that the “profound and rapidly changing character of war 
and conflict in the twenty-first century compels us to transform our leader development to 
maintain our competitive advantage and successfully prepare for the emerging ways of war 
our nation could face…and to achieve intellectual overmatch against adversaries, we must 
produce the most professionally competent, strategic-minded, and critically thinking 
officers possible.”200 Garvin said that “learning organizations are not built overnight. Most 
successful examples are the products of carefully cultivated attitudes, commitments, and 
management processes that have accrued slowly and steadily over time.”201 The 
infrastructure that supports military learning must be built with this same understanding. 
Like the seed that becomes a tree, sometimes decades later, the decisions the Navy makes 
today have the potential to bear fruit in the future, and educational institutions are the 
foundation from which our naval learning organization can be built.  
The 2018 Education for Seapower (E4S) report reinforced the Navy’s desire to 
become more like a learning organization and its need to reorient its education system. 
From the E4S, the Navy developed the following strategic vision: 
 
198 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Way of War: 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management. 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), 1. 
199 Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 383–405. 
200 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Way of War, 
6. 
201 Garvin, “Building a Learning Organization,” 28. 
72 
The Naval Education Enterprise must produce leaders of character, 
integrity, and intelligence steeped not only in the art of war, the profession 
of arms, and the history and traditions of the naval service, but also in a 
broader understanding of the technical and strategic complexities of the 
Cognitive Age, vital to assuring success in war, peace, and grey zone 
conflict; officer and enlisted leaders of every rank who think critically, 
communicate clearly, and are imbued with a bias for decisive and ethical 
action.202 
The E4S also stressed that “lifelong education in the naval profession becomes both 
a personal and an institutional responsibility, for achievement in learning is vital for the 
strategic viability and long-term lethality of our fighting forces and the nation.”203  
Despite the recognized need to resource its educational institutions, long-range 
planning is difficult for the United States Department of Defense, as it does not have the 
benefit of guaranteed long-term funding needed to commit to some of these more ambitious 
educational proposals. Long-term funding and commitment from legislators are often 
elusive and inconsistent, with each military service and its various departments competing 
for the same funding and resources each and every fiscal year. The governments of United 
States rivals, specifically China and Russia, do not have these types of challenges, as these 
nations have less oversight, more discretion, and can often commit to twenty- and thirty-
year plans with less resistance than the United States. While the checks-and-balances of 
the United States budgeting process provide protection for fraud, waste, and abuse, an 
unintended side effect is that long-term funding is heavily scrutinized, and put before 
rigorous checks before any new annual appropriation is passed and approved. To this end, 
the Navy must focus and validate its requirements and be prepared to defend them each 
year through its various Resource Sponsors (RS) and Budget Submitting Offices (BSO). 
Despite the annual budget validation requirements, military organizations must recognize 
that there are still major benefits to long-range planning. The smallest course corrections 
made in the present can still pay huge dividends decades into the future, so long as a long-
range plan is emphasized and maintained.  
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2. The Importance of Professional Military Education and War Colleges 
PME has always been considered important for today’s naval leaders, but it has 
been given renewed attention since the release of the 2018 NDS, which called for a renewed 
focus for PME to be regarded as a strategic asset. 
Our PME institutions must be an agile and adaptable enterprise. 
Collaboration across our PME network enhances our programs, builds 
synergy and deeper understanding, and enables us to focus on key problems. 
In the process, the education enterprise can serve our joint warfighters with 
rigorous studies and research, concept development, and exercise design. 
Our PME enterprise must be dynamic. To remain relevant, we must 
periodically assess our programs, validate missions and focus, as well as 
determine gaps and where new programs are needed. At the same time, we 
should strive to make our PME enterprise accessible to the force that is not 
in residence and support self-development and unit professional 
development programs, recognizing that these extend the core mission. We 
must continue to incorporate allied and partner students within our PME 
system to better prepare our own officers for global operations. Strong 
relationships between PME institutions are also important to support allied 
and partner PME programs as we innovate, creating opportunities for closer 
ties and deeper collaboration, and for greater U.S. student participation.204 
The NDS said that “PME has stagnated, focused more on the accomplishment of 
mandatory credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.” 205 It also stated the need to 
“emphasize intellectual leadership and military professionalism in the art and science of 
warfighting, deepening our knowledge of history while embracing new technology and 
techniques to counter competitors.”206 The report also cited a need to properly manage 
talent in DOD organizations, to include a better understanding of how different 
departments work together to make decisions. 
“Military education is valuable because it provides an intellectual architecture for 
battlefield success. It contributes to stable civil-military relations, a culture of reflection, 
 
204 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8. 
205 United States Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: 
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 
8. 
206 United States Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 8. 
74 
and a capacity for critical analysis.”207 In their 2020 report, the Joint Chiefs emphasized 
that the United States military “requires leaders at all levels who can achieve intellectual 
overmatch against adversaries.”208 The purpose behind this amended approach stems from 
the realization that future challenges are unlikely to be similar to the regional conflicts the 
United States has most recently experienced, but rather, facing rivals with equal, and 
perhaps even larger militaries will require the United States to think and adapt faster, while 
not having the luxury of having larger forces and near-endless resources to fall back on. 
Taking a closer look at rivals, the E4S also noted that “the path to promotion of a general 
officer in Russia is through the General Staff Academy in Moscow, a two-year course. 
Similarly, in China, examinations are vital in determining promotions, as the Chinese are 
adopting a very entrepreneurial approach in demanding of its future officer to be highly 
innovative, particularly in IT and AI skills.”209 
It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. America 
is a target, whether from terrorists seeking to attack our citizens; malicious 
cyber activity against personal, commercial, or government infrastructure; 
or political and information subversion. New threats to commercial and 
military uses of space are emerging, while increasing digital connectivity of 
all aspects of life, business, government, and military creates significant 
vulnerabilities. During conflict, attacks against our critical defense, 
government, and economic infrastructure must be anticipated.210 
The past two decades have seen the United States military concentrate much of its 
focus towards Afghanistan and Iraq, with the bulk of PME conducted during this time 
primarily focused on lessons learned from these two theaters. Much of this has been by 
design and not in vain, as one of the chief responsibilities of PME has always been to 
maintain relevancy to current and existing conflicts. The unintended consequence is that it 
has also inadvertently focused military attention and education away from the largest future 
rivals, China, and Russia. A gap exists between the lessons of the Cold War’s Eastern 
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Europe and today’s emerging global challenges, a side effect of the United States being the 
only superpower over a thirty-year period. Some of the previous Cold War lessons learned 
have been lost, or at a minimum need to be revisited, as these types of experiences and 
education have unfortunately atrophied over time. China has not effectively been 
challenged in the South China Sea, nor has the United States kept pace with Russia’s 
modern Arctic capabilities. While this shortfall does not fall squarely on the United States 
military, the DOD has not given the attention to these theaters that they undoubtedly 
deserve, as these once-emerging threats have since, emerged. 
Recognizing that a shift is necessary, the Joint Chiefs have stressed the need to 
adapt and innovate PME: 
Our PME enterprise must continuously assess, adapt, and innovate. We 
cannot afford to be complacent, nor can we afford to shortchange PME 
institutions and their students with barriers to effective learning or 
inadequate resources. Our first task is to reorient the PME enterprise to 
prepare joint officers to operate globally, across all domains, and lead 
decisively throughout the remainder of their careers. Initially we must shift 
our PME curricula from a predominately topic-based model to an outcomes-
based approach and emphasize ingenuity, intellectual application, and 
military professionalism in the art and science of warfighting, while 
deepening knowledge of history. Staying current means that our work is not 
done once these initial tasks are complete. Warfare, geopolitics, technology, 
and instructional methods will continue to change, and our PME systems 
must keep pace.211 
The Joint Chiefs also identify their respective war colleges playing a key role in the 
development of future flag officers, and these institutions have the potential to share 
experiences and improve doctrine through Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
curriculum. This serves to “infuse a joint context that reassesses current JPME framework 
in the context of demonstrated experience over the past thirty years to ensure we are 
evolving JPME requirements of the twenty-first century.”212 
The Navy is also taking small but gradual steps to establish a Naval University 
System (NUS). Currently, the Naval Academy provides undergraduate education, while 
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NPS and NWC provide post-secondary education. A common criticism of the existing 
system is that while “each of the components of the naval educational enterprise is 
performing relatively well individually—it is not sufficiently integrated or coordinated as 
a whole. The value proposition is that the Fleet and Marine Operating Forces depend on 
education to enhance our leaders’ ability to think and reason strategically and 
critically…which requires that continuous learning be instituted across the services.”213 A 
refined NUS would ensure all three of these institutions remain synchronized and relevant, 
whereas each tends to operate somewhat independently of each other in their current 
structure. A NUS would also ensure that Naval Reserve Officer and Training Corps 
(NROTC) training conducted onboard civilian universities are also adhering to current 
PME requirements.  
Finally, the Navy is adding the United States Naval Community College (NCC) to 
the new NUS, an entirely new concept, and a first for the DOD. The Navy understands that 
the bulk of its sailors are enlisted, and as they are the technical experts of so many essential 
functions. Enlisted education and development are the key elements to this new strategy: 
The need for this new community college is driven by the changing nature 
of warfare. In the twenty-first century, war is becoming even more 
technologically complex, and moving at an accelerated pace, forcing 
decision-making down to the NCO and petty officer level. To perform at 
our best and to protect our national security, we need to deploy the most 
technically advanced and intellectually capable enlisted force in the world. 
The raw material we possess—our enlisted sailors and Marines—is the best 
in the world. They are smart, disciplined, and focused. If we give them 
additional tools, through advanced community college educations, they will 
be even more effective.214 
While the Navy often leads from the top, it cannot compete with its rivals if it only 
learns from the top. The E4S highlighted that the Navy has overall under-valued, under-
resourced and under-exploited education, with most of its innovations more focused on 
training for specific job skills, and not the education that develops a sailor’s problem-
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solving capabilities. The NCC is a great step in the right direction, which when paired with 
the Navy’s overall education strategy, leaders hope it will facilitate the development of 
“officers and enlisted leaders of every rank who think critically, communicate clearly, and 
are imbued with a bias for decisive and ethical action.”215 These latest education initiatives 
also recognize the growing need for strengthening skills amongst the naval sciences, with 
a stronger emphasis on data analytics, information systems and artificial analysis. As jobs 
and careers are becoming more sophisticated, so too must the educational infrastructure 
that develops the sailors to fill these increasingly demanding positions. 
3. Commitment to Continuous Learning 
Learning is a constant process of discovery—a process without end. 
—Bruce Lee216 
 
Long-range planning and continuous learning are essential for building 
organizations that can “fire effectively first.” Recognizing that learning organizations are 
not built overnight, a long-term commitment is required to ensure that resources remain 
available for continuous learning, development, and growth. A successful NUS and PME 
proposals cannot fall victim to the common pitfalls of annual funding requirements. While 
budgets are inconsistent and future resources are never guaranteed, educational institutions 
and programs need to be a stable first priority.  
The U.S. military is being swept into tremendous shifts in the tides of global 
politics, economics, and security that will demand unprecedented 
innovation to navigate safely. Innovation is spawned by the synergy of 
disparate ideas spun into new—and often disruptive—concepts and 
capabilities. Diverse and continual education of our people is absolutely 
vital to this process. As such, it may be correctly said that the future of the 
sea services, and of our nation, rests squarely on the education of our 
workforce and those who lead it.217 
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The Navy appears to be taking some of the most important initial steps to cement 
its educational infrastructure. The E4S reinforces some of the core learning organization 
concepts, such as the reduction and dismantling of learning barriers, the importance of 
feedback loops, the removal of inefficient systems and processes, and the need to create 
practice fields to better understand the value of failure. Instead of simply funding 
institutions such as the NWC and NPS, the Navy is more cognizant of the need to ensure 
that the right students are attending, and that enrollment is purpose-focused and tied to the 
Navy’s current missions. While operations and education have often been segregated and 
competing for resources, the Navy is coming to understand that its educational 
infrastructure needs to better fit and support its operational requirements. Understanding 
the importance of this relationship helps to establish the learning culture the Chief of Naval 
Operations views as essential in trying to make the Navy a learning organization. 
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IV. APPLICATIONS AND BARRIERS 
 MILITARY CULTURE 
One of the most difficult obstacles when trying to institute change in the military, 
is often military culture itself. Our Navy is perhaps the service most tied to its traditions, 
which can create a predisposition to resist even the smallest suggestions that seek to change 
or improve a process, a platform, or a mission. Sailors, who they are, what they do, whether 
as individuals or teams, are no exception to this self-defensive posture sometimes seen in 
our Navy. Innovation, for all its benefits, can be seen as a threat to established doctrine and 
current leaders’ experiences. Each new generation of sailors will have different sets of 
experiences than the preceding generation. This generational divide can be troublesome, 
as the experiences of senior leaders, especially those leaders that have had successful 
careers, can be stubborn to change existing practices and established doctrine. Experience 
is valuable, but some types of experience expire, and while history and perspective are 
immensely important and need to be shared, relevance and applicability also matter for a 
learning organization seeking to adapt and improve in constantly evolving and challenging 
scenarios. We must change the way we perceive and prioritize learning if we want to keep 
pace with our rivals, especially concerning the modernization of learning systems currently 
taking place in China and Russia. 
As discussed in Chapter II, Rosen argued that there is little incentive to innovate 
amongst military officers, because the promotion structure of the military tends to reward 
officers that follow more traditional career paths. Senior officers tend to be more receptive 
to the career decisions of junior officers that mirror their own career decisions, creating a 
“like me” bias often found in civilian organizations. Senior officers see their previous tours 
and experiences as a recipe for success, a proven road map, and understanding a junior 
officer’s alternate career path and career choices can be a difficult obstacle to overcome. 
Rosen also concluded that officers considered “mavericks” who challenge the status quo 
and advocate for improvement, often suffer professionally for their efforts, with many 
failing to promote to the senior officer ranks. For the few innovative junior officers that do 
survive and promote, it can take 20 years or longer until they are in senior positions of 
80 
influence, meaning it took an entire generation for their innovation to reach the top, after 
which they have precious few years remaining before retirement. 218 
But while military culture can be perceived as a hindrance to innovation and 
evolution, it can also be tapped to facilitate change, making it a strong asset. “Military 
culture may be the most important factor not only in military effectiveness, but also in the 
processes involved in military innovation, which is essential to preparing military 
organizations for the next war.”219 
The difficulty in addressing military culture in a scholarly fashion derives 
not only from the complexity of the subject, but also the fact that its 
influence is almost always the result of long-term factors rarely measurable 
and often obscure even to historians. What is more, military culture 
obviously changes over time in response to changes in a society’s culture, 
the advance of technology, and the impact of leadership. Lieutenant General 
Van Riper once noted, military cultures are like great ocean liners or aircraft 
carriers: they require an enormous effort to change direction. While those 
making changes in an institution’s value system at times have a clear idea 
of the results they seek, in most cases they do not, and in any case cannot 
be assured of achieving the desired results…as there are no short-term 
solutions to problems in military culture. Those interested in reforming 
military culture must recognize instead that reforms, changes in emphasis, 
or even radical surgery will not yield immediate results. An effective change 
in military culture can only occur over a period of decades, and it is as likely 
that unintended effects of reforms on the cultural patterns of an organization 
may be more significant than intended effects. 220 
Just as some of the greatest new ideas come from old books, the Navy of the early 
twentieth century during the interwar period provides a road map for developing a learning 
culture and making the transition to a learning organization. Small but realistic course 
corrections made in the present can have a profound effect in the future. A stable 
educational infrastructure, along with ensuring the best faculty are chosen to staff schools, 
along with the right students attending them, is a solid step in the right direction. Our Navy 
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already has several essential pieces in place, it only needs to verify and enhance its’ current 
systems to ensure they remain effective. 
The E4S highlighted the importance of lifelong continuing education and the need 
to study and understand competitors and adversaries.221 Becoming a learning organization 
is essential if the Navy is to keep pace with its twenty-first century rivals.  
Above all, the services need to practice some profound introspection, for 
unless they understand themselves and how different their world views are 
from those of our opponents in the next century, the United States is headed 
for a major crack-up that could prove even more disastrous than the 
Vietnam War. For at a minimum, notes an eminent military historian, our 
strategists must see clearly both themselves and potential adversaries, their 
strengths, weaknesses, preconceptions, and limits-through humility, 
relentless and historically informed critical analysis, and restless 
dissatisfaction even in victory. They must weigh imponderables through 
structured debates that pare away personal, organizational, and national 
illusions and conceits.222 
Williamson Murray also cautioned against failing to learn and adapt when 
discussing the weaknesses of entrenched military cultures: 
It has often taken defeat to force substantive adaptation to the actual 
conditions of war. The less willing a culture is to display flexibility in 
peacetime, the more likely it is to have difficulty in adapting to the real 
conditions of war. There is a consistent historical pattern of military 
organizations attempting to impose their prewar concepts of future combat 
on the actual conditions of war instead of adapting to those conditions.223 
By stressing the importance of continuous organizational learning now, along with 
providing the essential support structure of a learning organization to facilitate learning, 
the Navy will be better positioned to meet twenty-first century threats in the future. As the 
literature points out, military culture does not need to be a learning inhibitor, as shown 
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 BUREAUCRACIES AND HIERARCHIES 
Aside from military culture and the predisposition to resist change, one of the most 
difficult challenges the Navy faces is operating within the bureaucracy of the federal 
government, where most decisions are reserved only for the hierarchies at the top of each 
respective department and their subordinate public organizations. Unlike military culture, 
the Navy has little choice but to operate within the constraints of the federal government 
and the DOD. As an annually funded appropriation, the Navy cannot exercise discretion 
over most of its annual budget, which makes it difficult to prioritize which programs 
receive funding and which programs do not. 
American businesses have become leaner in recent decades, with flatter 
management structures. Research has found that the average number of 
executives reporting directly to corporate CEOs has increased substantially 
in recent decades, while the number of management layers in major 
corporations has fallen. By contrast, in the federal government, “layering 
has become very extreme.” Paul Light found that the number of layers, or 
ranks by title, in the typical federal agency has jumped from 7 to 18 since 
the 1960’s. The federal workforce has become top-heavy with a growing 
number of executive designations (such as "principal associate deputy 
undersecretary"). Light concluded that today's "over-layered chain of 
command" in the government is a major cause of failure. Overlaying stifles 
information flow, and it makes it hard to hold anyone accountable for 
failures.224 
Government bureaucracies are also prone to excessive rules and regulations; the 
red tape which often reduces efficiency, but admittedly is sometimes required to prevent 
fraud and corruption due to the large number of government contracts and federal funding 
handed out to vendors each year. In the fight for funding, the Navy must also learn to 
tactfully manage its relationships with competing political parties and special interests, all 
of which compete for the same pot of dollars while trying to justify why their programs 
should be funded, and others should not. 
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In his 2014 book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates spoke openly about his frustrations in trying to reform the DOD: 
The very size and structure of the department assured ponderousness, if not 
paralysis because so many different organizations had to be involved in 
even the smallest decisions. The idea of speed and agility to support current 
combat operations was totally foreign to the building. It was quickly 
apparent that only I, as secretary, had the authority to change that. If that 
gargantuan, labyrinthine bureaucracy was to support the war fighter 
effectively and with speed, the initiative would have to come from the top. 
As usual in a huge bureaucracy, the villains were the largely nameless and 
faceless people—and their leaders—who were wed to their old plans, 
programs, and thinking and refused to change their ways regardless of 
circumstances. The hidebound and unresponsive bureaucratic structure that 
the Defense Department uses to acquire equipment performs poorly in 
peacetime. As I saw, it did so horribly in wartime. And then, as I’ve already 
said, there was the department’s inexplicable peacetime mind-set in 
wartime.225 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process also tends 
to hinder potential improvements throughout the DOD. Originally introduced by Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara in the early 1960’s, it is a system that each branch of the 
military uses “to justify, document, and allocate their annual share of DOD resources.”226 
While the system has multiple layers of checks and balances to ensure full justification of 
each department and service branch’s fiscal requirements, it also has an unintended side 
effect of locking budget controls in specific programs for long periods of time, making it 
difficult to reallocate funding to other important programs that may become higher 
priorities as situations develop.  
The military departments develop their budgets on a five-year basis, and 
most procurement programs take many years—if not decades—from 
decision to delivery. As a result, budgets and programs are locked in for 
years at a time, and all the bureaucratic wiles of each military department 
are dedicated to keeping those programs intact and funded. They are joined 
in those efforts by the companies that build the equipment, the Washington 
lobbyists that those companies hire, and the members of Congress in whose 
states or districts those factories are located. Any threats to those long-term 
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programs are not welcome. Even if we are at war. For the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the needs of the field commanders and their troops were 
forwarded as requests to the regional combatant commander, who reviewed 
them and, if he was in agreement, pushed them to the Pentagon. Each 
request then had to pass through a Joint Chiefs of Staff filter, a military 
department filter, a department comptroller (the money person) filter, 
multiple procurement bureaucracy filters, and often other filters, any of 
which could delay or stop fulfillment of the requested equipment. These 
current, urgent requests were weighed against the existing long-term plans, 
programs, and available budgets and all too often were found to be lower in 
priority than nearly everything else—which meant they disappeared into a 
Pentagon black hole.227 
The lack of flexibility and discretionary spending make it challenging to better 
support military leaders engaged globally in different theaters, whose conditions and 
scenarios vary widely, and are not subject to the standardization and consistency 
requirements of the PPBE process. It is even more difficult to justify budget dollars for 
training and education, as these programs are harder to validate for the various levels of 
the PPBE hierarchy. Operational requirements are real-world, in the present-tense, and 
much easier to justify. Educational requirements are more difficult to quantify; their future-
tense return on investment can be viewed as subjective to the various leaders who may be 
hesitant to approve such initiatives, especially if the competition for funding and resources 
removes funding from other programs that are perceived to hold priority.  
 REALISTIC APPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recognizing that the Navy has very little budgetary discretion and will always be 
subject to legislation and the restrictive controls of an annual appropriation, many of the 
transformations that private organizations endure, are simply not an option. But, 
understanding where we are now, and that building a learning organization is not an 
overnight process, there are still some early steps we can take in the present that can serve 
as the course corrections that put the Navy in a better position in the future.  
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1. Leadership and Creating Space 
Because the DOD operates within the constraints of an annual budget 
appropriation, there is very little space for the Navy to exercise discretion on how and 
where it educates and develops its sailors. Since there is very little space to begin with, 
leaders have only one viable alternative, this space must be created. There is some room 
between the funding and resources that have been given, and how it is to be executed; 
leaders simply need to learn how to get potential initiatives approved through a legal and 
validated process. 
While certain processes exist, they can be tricky to navigate. Programs such as the 
Navy’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM), Mid-Year Review (MYR) and Omnibus 
budget programs are excellent methods to develop proposals to realign funds or identify 
funding shortfalls in education, but these programs can be arduous for first-time users. A 
Commanding Officer (CO) attempting to navigate these processes may be doing it for the 
first time, while others with experience may have moved on from these assignments. 
The Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) School is an excellent place to bridge 
this gap through the development of a formalized mentorship program. While some 
mentorship programs certainly exist, they are somewhat non-standardized. Many newly 
selected CO’s may also be hesitant to reach out to superiors if they feel they may have 
influence on their fitness reports or future promotion opportunities. As detailed by 
Edmondson in Chapter II, this fear creates a community of silence, where the people who 
need help the most, are the least likely to speak up. Leaders may choose not to voice 
concerns, because they feel that their organization does not have the psychological safety 
that permits them to ask for assistance without fear of retribution. A formalized mentorship 
program can still promote informal dialogue, as an as-needed, mentor perspective can pay 
dividends when addressing the issue of psychological safety.  
Experienced leaders can share previous experiences and show how they were able 
to lead and successfully create the space to make some of their own decisions, especially 
during times when a new commander may feel they have no space to lead or maneuver in. 
With modern missions becoming less simple and routine, multitasking and collaboration 
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are some of the best approaches to meet twenty-first century challenges, as the “go it alone” 
strategy severely limits the options of a leader and their crew. The Navy can make its 
smartest decisions when it leverages the experiences of a team instead of placing the burden 
on one individual. Only in a psychologically safe environment can a team reach its full 
potential, because they are more open to new ideas and less protective of their personal 
images and statuses.228 
Mentors can provide experiences where they have found success working within 
the constraints that they were given in a previous assignment. Mentors can illustrate how 
they were able to procure additional funding for education, such as modernizing a computer 
laboratory, building a simulator, or providing middle-management training for its sailors 
by legally partnering with private organizations under the permission of the Navy’s Staff 
Judge Advocate (SJA). Previous experiences serve as road maps for current experiences, 
and these types of programs increase the organizational IQ of an organization, while also 
keeping them legal and avoiding conflicts of interest when partnering with private vendors. 
PCO School is simply a port of entry for a mentorship database to be built, where 
graduates from previous years can be paired up with recently selected commanders. Even 
if a mentorship program is formalized, it does not need to be mandatory. The Navy has 
options as to how formal it chooses to make it, but a formalized mentorship program is a 
near zero-cost initiative that could help to alleviate some of the common headaches and 
scenarios that many of our newer CO’s are facing. 
2. Lateral Transfers and Depth versus Range  
One of the most common debates I have experienced in college classrooms is the 
depth vs range argument, with many individuals arguing that one method is superior to the 
other when attempting to become great at something. In his 2008 book, Outliers: The Story 
of Success, Malcolm Gladwell emphasized depth in practice, specialization, and a focused 
learning environment as keys to becoming proficient at a specific skill.229 Conversely, 
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David Epstein in his 2019 book, Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World, 
argues that a diverse experience across multiple skills is more relevant in today’s constantly 
changing environment, and relying on a breadth of experience is more effective in finding 
creative solutions and solving problems.230 While many individuals might be tempted to 
pick a side of the depth versus range discussion, I believe a dialogue on a depth of range is 
more effective. Is there a reason why our Navy cannot enjoy the benefits of both?  
In the unrestricted line officer communities, commonly known as the Navy’s 
warfighters, specialization is important. Many Sailor’s lives rely on each other’s ability to 
execute their duties with precision in a variety of specialties. Their careers typically follow 
specific career pipelines, sometimes referred to as the golden path. It is difficult for these 
officers to gain experience in warfare communities outside of their own, which like many 
organizations, has the unintended consequence of keeping these different communities in 
their own respective silos, often disconnected from each other. This impedes a valuable 
transfer in knowledge. As Garvin emphasized, “for learning to be more than a local affair, 
knowledge must spread quickly and efficiently throughout the organization. Ideas carry 
maximum impact when they are shared broadly rather than held in a few hands.”231 There 
is no substitute for quality first-hand experience, which is why lateral transfers can be 
extremely valuable. Temporary or permanent job-swapping within an organization is an 
excellent way to facilitate knowledge transfer.232 Temporary or permanent transfers 
between units can also help to widen the experience of both new and existing Sailors.233 
Under the Navy’s current model, the lateral transfer program means permanent 
assignment to a designator different from the Sailor’s current career field, but lateral 
transfers do not need to be permanent. Temporary lateral transfers can help to facilitate the 
types of experiences, lessons learned, and knowledge transfer that Garvin and others have 
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advocated for. These shorter crosswalk opportunities allow an individual to experience the 
challenges and realities of their fellow sailors without their current communities losing 
them. A crosswalk-type of temporary lateral transfer can be as short as a few weeks, a 
matter of months, or a six-month deployment in some scenarios. The benefit to both the 
Navy and the individual Sailor is that it enables a lot of exposure to several environments 
and different scenarios. Building perspective and having exposure to many things is 
important because it reduces the chances of seeing something for the first time. A Sailor’s 
ability to draw from a range of experiences in their past better prepares them for complex 
challenges in the future. 
Marquardt stressed the importance of job rotation, lateral transfers and team mixing 
as effective ways to share knowledge. Subject matter experts are put into positions where 
they can ensure the successful transmission of their knowledge, and newer team members 
are more willing to ask the questions that established employees will not. These types of 
questions bring with them a new perspective that can lead to new insights and creative 
solutions not previously discovered by individuals that may be too close to the problem.234 
If a temporary lateral transfer program is too extensive for the more specialized 
unrestricted line officer communities, a smaller application to the restricted line and staff 
corps officer designators could still benefit, as their career paths are typically broader, less 
defined, and less specialized than their warfighting peers. For example, the officers in the 
Navy’s Specialty Career Path (SCP) and Shore Installation Management (SIM) pipelines 
manage several broad areas of warfighting personnel and facilities, whose experiences 
could be amplified by temporary lateral transfers and assignments to different officer 
communities. These officers can better understand the unique challenges and missions their 
peers face so that they can better manage and support them. A temporary lateral transfer 
program allows more discretion for the Navy’s officer and enlisted community managers, 
and the shorter nature of these assignments make it easier to justify for both military policy 
writers and legislators that appropriate funding.  
 
234 Marquardt, Building the Learning Organization, 149–51. 
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3. Lateral Learning and Outside Perspective 
Garvin and Schein stressed that knowledge must be shared both laterally and 
vertically within an organization to maximize learning. They also highlight the importance 
of outside experiences, as these build additional perspective, help to eliminate blind spots, 
and build insight when trying to solve challenging problems. Insight allows organizations 
to adapt to changing conditions faster than its competitors because change management 
groups and steering committees have a breadth of experiences to draw from when making 
decisions to change an organization’s direction.235 
The Navy’s Tours with Industry (TWI) program is a great example of developing 
this type of insight. 236 Understanding how outside organizations operate and innovate 
provides a road map for the Navy to borrow and share these types of experiences, as Sailors 
can benefit from the lessons learned from of the United States’ most successful 
organizations willing to partner with the DOD.  
When Sailors are struggling to find suitable assignments between sea tours, an 
expanded TWI program could provide a variety of internships that could bring useful 
solutions to some of the current problems the Navy is trying to solve. Cybersecurity 
personnel would benefit from time spent shadowing the teams at Apple and Qualcomm, 
and Supply Corps personnel can shadow the logistics experts at FedEx, UPS and Amazon 
to more efficiently transport people and equipment. The Navy’s Research Development 
Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) teams can benefit from internships at Space X and Tesla, 
learning how to extend endurance and range by using self-sustaining renewable energy, or 
how to better support maritime missions by using offshore mobile refueling stations built 
from refurbished semi-submersible oil platforms. These are the types of experiences and 
insight that some of these organizations currently have, that the Navy does not. The TWI 
program is an excellent program that should be expanded, as the value for the Navy and 
the Sailor should be weighed against some of the standardized routine administrative 
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assignments that many Sailors are often forced to accept simply due to a lack of other billet 
options. 
While TWI addresses a critical need to bring insight and perspective from private 
organizations, there currently is no similar program for other government organizations 
wishing to work together. A proposal to solve this could potentially be something similar 
to a Naval Personnel Repository (NPR). An NPR would consist of a predetermined quota 
of internships hosted by other government agencies that the Navy agrees are of value. 
These internships would provide a means of building the perspective, insight, exposure, 
and experience discussed in earlier chapters. Sailors could fill internships similar to TWI, 
but instead of shadowing at private organizations, they work under the umbrella of another 
federal department. These internships would be opportunities where both federal 
organizations see a mutual benefit to the Sailors’ participation.  
For example, the most recent NDS highlights several emerging challenges. Russia 
has reestablished itself in the Arctic, bringing with them an “improved icebreaker fleet, a 
modernized airport network, and established a modern information and telecommunication 
infrastructure.”237 While the Russian military is gaining experience and improved 
capabilities in this region, the United States military has less Arctic capability now than it 
did during the Cold War. While the Navy has a lack of experience in the region, other 
federal organizations do not. To help bridge this experience gap, an NPR program would 
allow Sailors the opportunity to fill internship positions and shadow operators currently 
stationed in the Arctic, such as the operators of the North Warning System (NWS), which 
are Cold War era stations and radar sites on the shorelines of Alaska and Canada, that 
evolved from the Defense Early Warning (DEW) system that preceded it. Sailors could 
better understand what is needed to improve maritime operations north of the Arctic Circle, 
while also helping to define what future capabilities could be possible and what 
infrastructure would be needed to support them. A temporary interservice transfer with the 
Coast Guard could also benefit, as they are the only remaining United States service with 
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icebreaking capability and familiarity operating in these types of environments. The Navy 
stands to benefit from gaining experience from the professionals currently stationed in the 
Arctic, as this is an expanding theater the Navy may be forced to operate in more frequently 
in the near future.  
Another concern highlighted by the NDS and E4S has been the emergence of China 
as a future superpower, specifically their operations in the South China Sea and the 
construction of military installations on artificial islands built by land reclamation vessels. 
Similar to Russia’s newly developed capabilities in the Arctic, the Chinese Navy has an 
ability to operate on remote islands that most Sailors in the United States Navy do not, 
however there are individuals within other federal organizations that do. Sailors could 
better understand what it is like to operate on an isolated island by shadowing some of the 
federal organizations that are currently stationed on similar islands in the Pacific. The 
United States has federal employees and civilian contractors that form a small semi-
permanent presence on some of the more established islands, while the Coast Guard visits 
some of the more remote islands and atolls temporarily utilized depending on current 
missions. In either scenario, a Sailor can gain experience in an environment the Navy may 
be forced to operate in more frequently in the near future.  
An NPR could allow a public works officer in the Civil Engineer Corps to learn 
more about drafting different types of joint-land use agreements between different federal, 
state and county organizations by shadowing someone at the Department of the Interior, or 
a physician in the Medical Corps could find value in shadowing someone from the 
Department of Health & Human Services. These are the types of lateral learning 
opportunities that bring a breadth of experience back to the Navy, with the benefit of no 
break in government service. An NPR of available positions could also help to temporarily 
staff positions waiting to be filled permanently by the gaining organization, as the time to 
recruit for some of these remote positions may be extensive. 
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4. Teaching Organizations and the Expansion of PME 
Teaching is the highest form of understanding. 
—Aristotle238 
 
Teaching organizations can be the bridge that gets our Navy to where we want it 
to be. The expansion of PME at multiple levels is an excellent way to accomplish this. 
Teaching organizations make excellent learning organizations, because they encourage 
the sharing of information and the reinforcement of learning. According to Bill Taylor, 
for organizations to “stay ahead of the competition, their people, at every level, have to 
learn more (and more quickly) than the competition: new skills, new takes on emerging 
technologies, new ways to do old things.”239  
One thing I’ve learned over the last few years, as I’ve traveled the world in 
search of organizations unleashing big change in difficult circumstances, is 
that the most determined innovators — the organizations with the most 
original ideas about how to compete and win — aren’t just committed to 
learning. They are just as committed to teaching. They understand that the 
only sustainable form of market leadership is thought leadership.240 
Our Navy already has a few premier teaching organizations in place. Our war 
colleges are tremendous strategic assets, we simply need to ensure that they are resourced 
and staffed appropriately. We must also ensure that their respective curriculums remain 
relevant to current and future strategic goals. Both the NDS and Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
2020 Strategic Vision and Guidance for PME and Talent Management called for a renewed 
focus on PME to be regarded as a strategic asset, and that “the profound and rapidly 
changing character of war and conflict in the twenty-first century compels us to transform 
our leader development to maintain our competitive advantage and successfully prepare 
for the emerging ways of war our nation could face.”241 Remember from Chapter III that 
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both Russia and China have recently invested considerable effort and resources 
establishing PME institutions at multiple levels in their respective militaries. If our Navy 
wants to achieve the intellectual overmatch over its rivals that it desires, the expansion of 
PME must remain a top priority. 
The Navy could expand PME by exploring what potential cost-sharing public-
private venture opportunities may exist. As most PME is completed with in-house 
resources, possible future expansion could include public-private partnerships with outside 
agencies for the procurement and staffing of training ships, or improved ship and aircraft 
simulators located at more installations. An improved simulation environment allows for 
better training and the creation of Tactical Decision Games (TDG) that are more realistic 
and relevant to modern scenarios. 
At the operational level, solicitation of services are not allowed on government 
property, but there are some existing models of successful public-private relationships 
exercised onboard naval installations.242 If private organizations or civilian schools are 
offering free education or services, support agreements between the Navy and these 
organizations can allow mutual learning benefits in some areas, pending SJA approval and 
no conflicts of interest nor ethics violations exist.  
While there are strict rules that prohibit military members from working alongside 
law enforcement agencies due to complicated posse comitatus perceptions, Emergency 
Management (EM) is a growing field in the United States where some potential public-
private partnerships exist.243 Several cities and counties have established Emergency 
Operation Centers (EOCs) to better manage critical resources during civil emergencies 
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, flooding, chemical spills, and other random 
emergencies that occasionally arise. How EOCs handle these types of emergencies, 
specifically the deployment of first responders and critical resources while dealing with a 
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civilian populace; is an excellent opportunity for the Navy’s SIM personnel to shadow 
some of the nation’s leading EM experts while taking these lessons learned back to the 
naval installations they manage. In addition to an excellent learning opportunity, having a 
presence in some of these EOC shared-spaces during actual emergencies helps Navy 
leaders make more informed decisions, because they now have Sailors in position to be the 
first to receive the most reliable information.  
There are also potential partnerships between some of the Navy’s RDT&E facilities 
and academic institutions. A few of the Naval Surface Warfare Centers currently have 
support agreements to share certain facilities, and others even co-host STEM and invention 
conventions with local colleges.244 Smaller colleges often have more flexibility than larger 
universities, many of which are co-located within the same counties as many of our military 
installations. These types of academic relationships have tremendous potential, as the staffs 
onboard some of these colleges are very supportive of our military and willing to assist 
when able. The professors onboard provide critical outside perspective, and an ability to 
innovate in ways that many of our junior Sailors have not yet experienced. Many campuses 
also offer additional benefits to active duty and veterans, such as early registration and 
additional tutoring, so the Navy currently has existing informal relationships that can be 
expanded. Some academic institutions have more discretion than others, but local 
installation commanders can gauge whether a potential future relationship is possible and 
engage CNIC and SJA to determine if one is feasible.  
Finally, for the officers selected to command larger organizations with a high 
percentage of DOD civilians, there are additional training opportunities that can be offered 
through the Navy’s PCO school and Intermediate Leadership Course (ILC) by creating 
support agreements with the government agencies that provide training for human 
resources. Many of the naval officers that attend are first-time commanders or department 
heads, with little experience managing civilian employees. The Navy outsources many of 
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its civilian human resource functions to the Navy Office of Civilian Human Resources 
(OCHR), and the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC) provides near identical 
services for the Army and several joint-commands. These organizations have a lot of 
experience dealing with hiring and retention, counseling and progressive discipline, 
performance improvement, union negotiation, how to properly manage during a 
sequestration, how to handle a furlough, and several other areas. These types of issues can 
be overwhelming for the officers that have not managed civilians before, which is why 
reaching out to these types of organizations for assistance could improve the professional 
working relationships between the Navy’s military members and DOD civilians. While 
many of the Navy’s URL officers likely do not need this type of assistance, officers in the 
SIM and SCP career tracks could stand to benefit, as many of these OCHR and CPAC 
organizations are co-located or within a few hours’ drive of several of our military 
installations. For the installations that are geographically isolated in remote areas, there are 
video teleconferencing training options that can suffice. Some military units currently 
exercise informal civilian HR assistance programs with these types of organizations, and 
these are the types of successful relationships that should be learned from and expanded 
across the fleet. If these types of programs are successful, the Navy should begin to see a 
reduction in civilian equal opportunity complaints, retaliatory inspector general filings, and 
other types of formal grievances that are processed when the relationships between military 
members and civilians are not as strong as they should be.  
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 LOOKING AT WHAT WORKS 
Going back to the original research question, “how can the Navy become a better 
learning organization,” some of the most successful learning organizations have the 
following similarities: 
Table 7. Common Trends and Key Characteristics 
Common Trends in Organizations Key Characteristics 
Promote Continuous Learning - Constructed feedback loops for faster 
improvement 
- Created space for hot groups and practice 
fields 
- Built better systems to share after action 
learning and solutions to common problems 
Invest in Human Capital - Facilitates professional learning at both 
internal and external vocational and  
post-secondary schools 
- Recognizes “people” as most important 
resource, valued more than technology or 
processes 
- Can be applied to Navy’s NPS, NWC, NCC, 
PCO and ILC institutions 
Decentralization - Reduce redundant reporting requirements 
where possible 
- Allows more time for creativity, innovation, 
and relevant problem solving 
- Organization remains large but units become 
smaller, making it easier to communicate and 
collaborate 
Discretion and Flexibility - Allows more decision-making authority at 
middle and lower levels 
- Mission remains focus but allows some 
flexibility on process 
Psychological Safety - Alleviates fear from punishment for 
speaking up 
- Promotes culture that rewards teams vice 
individuals 




The learning organizations that appear to be the most successful are the ones that 
have a structure in place that allows and supports organizational learning at all levels. They 
provide opportunities for continuous learning using built-in feedback loops and practice 
fields and may utilize the formation of task forces or hot groups to focus on either local or 
organization wide problems. These organizations also understand the importance of human 
capital, and choose to invest in its people, whereas other organizations may prioritize 
technology or the revamping of specific processes to increase efficiency. For the Navy, this 
could mean ensuring all naval academic institutions fall under non-discretionary funding, 
signaling them as must-pay initiatives instead of competing for annual resources. 
Categorizing these institutions as higher priorities allows them to build curriculums and 
support facilities with greater confidence if no longer distracted by the annual requirements 
that come with the pressure of an annual appropriation for funding. 
Decentralization is also a common trend amongst learning organizations. Flatter 
organizations have the advantage of keeping the organization large, but makes units 
smaller, providing flexibility and reducing redundant and unnecessary reporting 
requirements. Even when operating within a bureaucracy or hierarchy, decentralization 
allows individual units more time to develop problem-focused solutions without 
administrative distractions because it is easier to communicate and collaborate amongst 
team members. 
Discretion and flexibility involve creating space when and where it appears not to 
exist, allowing units to make their own decisions when possible. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, many of the best solutions come from the bottom-up, as those closest to the 
factory floor often have the best information to make better decisions. Allowing some 
discretion allows installation and unit-level commanders the authority and flexibility to 
determine what resources should be prioritized, which personnel should be recruited and 
retained, and which projects and programs should be funded.  
Psychological safety means developing a culture where individuals feel free to 
come forward and do not fear punishment for honest mistakes and proposing solutions. 
Individuals and teams have increased confidence to be creative, innovate, and allow some 
risk taking without fear of reprisal. Organizations with strong psychological safety tend to 
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have cultures that reward teams vice individuals. This does not need to remove 
competition, as competition is often essential in discovering the best solutions, but 
incentives for success are tied more to mission accomplishment than individual 
achievements. 
 FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
1. Building Organizational Structures  
Discretion and flexibility were determined to be common trends amongst modern 
learning organizations. Some of the larger naval organizations that are given some 
discretionary decision making and spending authority are our Navy Working Capital Fund 
(NWCF) and RDT&E organizations. These departments are amongst our best at 
innovation, often partnering with outside agencies and defense contractors to develop new 
technologies and improve fleet and installation services. Some are not as restricted to the 
constraints of an annual appropriation and one-year funding, as they operate under a 
revolving-fund concept that allows them to continue operations when many other naval 
organizations are forced to cease operations. Likewise, many NWCF and RDT&E 
organizations are not impeded by the occasional challenges that annually appropriated 
organizations face, such as continuing resolutions, sequestrations, and employee furloughs. 
Because these organizations are given more discretion, and funding is planned over a multi-
year period, they are less affected by government disruptions. 
A future research project could analyze and determine whether any of these types 
of organizations can provide a model that could be replicated elsewhere in the Navy. The 
SIM and SCP communities could be areas for potential expansion of this model, especially 
in the areas of research and development and more effective installation management. 
Next, the Navy understands the need to “spread good ideas faster”, but we are 
somewhat limited by our current versions of after-action reports and the sharing of lessons 
learned. Another future research project could attempt to determine whether parts of the 
Naval Warfare Studies Institute (NWSI) at NPS could be expanded to the fleet. Under the 
NWSI, the Naval Research Program (NRP), as well as individual events such as the 
Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) and Big Ideas Exchange (BIX), are excellent 
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examples where NPS students and staff collaborate across different schools and outside 
agencies. The ATHENA online collaborative research discovery tool is another recent 
development with a high potential to spark innovation by connecting technical experts that 
are geographically separated so they can collaborate to solve current and future problems. 
Future research could better determine whether these programs can be expanded or 
replicated either broadly or regionally in other parts of our Navy. 
2. Building Organizational Documents  
Would our Navy benefit from the creation of additional organizational documents 
that focus on learning? The Marine Corps has had a strong learning organizational 
infrastructure in place since their development of FMFM 1 Warfighting, and more recently, 
MCDP 7 Learning. These types of organizational documents provide substantial support 
to PME curriculums and schools such as the AWS and EWS at MCU. The Navy does not 
currently have any recent comparable field manuals nor defense publications. Would 
similar organizational documents improve or support our PME curriculums at NPS and 
NWC?  
3. The Naval Learning Ecosystem 
 How does our Navy actually learn? While certain units within the Navy have been 
analyzed, more research needs to be conducted to determine how we learn within our 
current structure, what Kozloski calls the Naval Learning Ecosystem, which “must be 
viewed as a strategic asset for the naval services, as it contains some of the greatest 
institutions our nation has to offer, with connections to similar organizations in the 
Department of Defense, National Labs and private research institutions.”245 A future 
research project could examine how we might improve our Navy’s learning structure and 
culture, by finding more effective ways to connect and communicate between different 
warfare communities to maximize learning within this CAS structure. 
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4. Better Data for Better Budgeting 
Finally, can data be better utilized to smooth out the rigors of annual budgeting? 
Discretion and flexibility can be challenging for different departments because funding is 
constrained by the restrictions of an annual appropriation. Annual appropriations come 
with annual justification reports and annual reporting requirements, which are time 
consuming and often repetitive of the preceding year’s submissions. As technology 
continues to improve, can better data analysis and synthesis make this easier by improving 
the current justification for each budget line item in the Navy’s Program Budget 
Information System (PBIS) by looking at historical trends to better predict future needs? 
The Navy’s Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) captures some of this for future years, 
but can better data analysis predict, and justify, in real-time, a four-year budget requirement 
instead of the current one-year budget requirement in place? Finding ways to accurately 
justify and secure multi-year funding would reduce the annual administrative burden that 
many of our BSO’s and RS’s currently face. These departments could save valuable time 
and have the discretion and flexibility to focus on more long-term goals instead of 
competing for annual funds. They would also have the ability and discretion to change 
direction quickly if a new mission requirement or operational need arises. Funding would 
be available because it sits in a four-year reserve instead of a one-year account, giving these 
organizations more time to replenish funds in future years instead of requesting additional 
funds during the current year. Can a system similar to the Navy’s existing NWCF and 
RDT&E budgeting models be put into place in other areas of our Navy? 
 FINAL THOUGHTS 
Are you learning as fast as the world is changing? 
—Gary Hamel246 
 
Can our Navy become a better learning organization? My own research has led me 
to believe that we can, but we appear to be fast approaching a critical decision point. We 
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have said and done many of the right things, but can we deliver, or will we be a Navy that 
seldom does what we say we will do? Our Navy has a history of brilliant ingenuity when 
we have been forced to learn, but these periods are intermittent, and often in response to 
conflict. Many of the historical events that have forced serious reform in the past, world 
wars, serious failures, and even massive budget cuts, are unlikely to happen anytime soon. 
Nothing external is going to force us to do this, we have to do this ourselves. For us to see 
this through, we must take charge of our own learning to become a better learning 
organization. 
We have some pieces of a learning infrastructure in place, but it will not be enough 
unless our entire Navy grows to understand the importance of a supportive learning 
organizational structure and why the need to develop intellectual human capital is so 
important. Can we do this? Absolutely, but my analysis also tells me that we will struggle. 
The questions our Navy must ask itself are: why do we sometimes learn best only when we 
are forced to learn? What is it about our Navy’s peacetime processes that make wartime 
challenges so difficult to adapt to? What else needs to happen for us to take learning 
seriously?  
In our Navy’s history, we have situations that forced us to learn quickly and 
collaborate rapidly to find solutions. We then have examples where these solutions were 
put into practice almost immediately, delivering the fast results we needed and often turned 
the tide of conflicts. We have seen smaller units in our organization that did learn, often in 
a hurry, that are positive examples of how we can learn faster in the future. The successful 
innovations we have experienced, whether in response to wartime mission requirements or 
during the interwar periods, are the types of examples that can serve as road maps as we 
apply these lessons learned to other parts of our Navy. If we tell ourselves that times have 
changed, and we cannot do this, then we must also be prepared to explain why our rivals 
can. 
Our Navy needs to continue to innovate. In areas we struggle to do so, we have the 
advantage of working with a private sector that leads the world in innovation. This is a 
lateral learning advantage that the United States has, and our rivals do not. We have plenty 
of room to expand our current and future partnerships between public and private 
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organizations and academic institutions. We only need to develop the learning 
infrastructure that can sustain these types of relationships. 
We need a report that details how our rivals learn, specifically China and Russia. 
We should also examine how some of our allies learn, especially those with smaller 
militaries and less funding to determine how their most effective units have found success 
despite limited resources. Without understanding comparative advantages, we cannot 
begin to develop competitive advantages. 
Finally, our Navy needs to find better and more effective ways of sharing lessons 
learned and individual experiences. How to become a better learning organization can be 
taught in several ways, whether they be in the form of stronger mentorship programs or 
improved PME curriculums at all levels of our Navy. We have so many constraints and 
restrictions, but within our ranks, we also have endless experience. We only lack the 
learning structure to share it. We must discover how to share knowledge and learn together. 
A learned lesson for one should be a shared lesson for many. 
We are so close, and we have everything we need. A few modest course corrections 
made now can put our Navy exactly where it wants to be in the future. 
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APPENDIX A. ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
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Table 9. Contrasts Between Training and Learning.249 
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Table 11. Changing Organizational Paradigms.251 
 
Table 12. The Move from Steady-State to Continuous Change.252 
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APPENDIX B. SYSTEM LEARNING ORGANIZATION MODEL 
 
Figure 9. Systems Learning Organization Model.254 
 
Figure 10. Learning Subsystem 
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Figure 11. Organization Subsystem.255 
 
Figure 12. People Subsystem.256 
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Figure 13. Knowledge Subsystem.257 
 
Figure 14. Technology Subsystem.258 
 
257 Marquardt, 27. 
258 Marquardt, 29. 
112 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
113 
APPENDIX C. BUILDING A LEARNING CULTURE 
 
Figure 15. Learning Culture.259 
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Figure 16. Learning Methods260 
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Figure 17. Work Skills for the Twenty-First Century261 
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